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ENDOGENOUS AND DANGEROUS
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Empirical studies show that courts frequently cite cases that the parties did
not cite during briefing and oral arguments—endogenous cases. This Article
shows the cognitive and rational dangers of endogenous cases and presents an
empirical study of their use. I contend that judges should avoid using endogenous
cases in their reasoning and opinions. This Article’s first significant contribution
is to provide the first exhaustive treatment in the American legal literature of the
rational bases upon which defeasible legal deductions and legal analogies may
be built and the critical questions or defeaters that can weaken or bring them
down. As far as we know, Aristotle was the first Westerner to formalize logic,
about 2,500 years ago. He recognized immediately, however, that the valid deductive forms of reasoning he described do not take us far in reasoning about
human affairs. Contemporary law scholars nevertheless talk about rule-based
and deductive reasoning as if it exists in the law. But all legal arguments, even
apparently deductive ones, are subject to defeat by counterargument—they are
defeasible. This Article shows that legal analogies are in a sense more defeasible,
and thus more complex, than legal deductions, and it suggests that legal policy
arguments are more defeasible still.
But what happens when judges build these arguments around cases that the
parties have not cited—endogenous cases? Studies suggest that judges do so
about half the time. The theory of defeasible arguments suggests judges should be
reluctant to do so, and they should be most reluctant to do so with legal analogies
and policy arguments. But until now, no study has examined how judges use endogenous cases. This Article’s second significant contribution is an empirical
study of cases judges cited in a random sample of federal district court opinions,
identifying where they found them and how they used them. It also identifies a hierarchy of badness among endogenous case uses, warning judges away from the
most dangerous. It concludes that judges should avoid endogenous cases or, at a
minimum, permit the parties to argue the cases before their application. Though
the opinions studied here were from federal trial courts, the principles extend to
any tribunal that uses opinions from previous cases to guide its decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies show that courts frequently cite cases that the parties did
not cite during briefing and oral arguments.1 This Article will contend that
judges should avoid using such “endogenous”2 cases in their reasoning and
opinions. This admonition is particularly strong where arguments from analogy
1

See infra Section II.A.
Kevin Bennardo & Alexa Z. Chew, Citation Stickiness, 20 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 64
(2019). For Bennardo and Chew, “sticky” citations are those that arose from within the
case’s proceedings and the parties’ briefs. Id. Note that the earlier studies cited later in this
Article did not use any of this nomenclature. See infra Section II.A.
This is as good a point as any to explain my typographical conventions: using double quotation marks only for material quoted from other authorities, single quotation marks for references to the name of a concept or any word or phrase not quoted from other authorities,
and Italics to indicate emphasis. See Brian N. Larson, Precedent as Rational Persuasion, 25
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 135, 138 n.2 (2021); cf. Scott Brewer, Exemplary
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy,
109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 931 n.14 (1996). So, I might have written:
2

While Bennardo and Chew called these citations “endogenous,” I call them ‘exogenous’ and
acknowledge that both usages are justified.

I also adopt the convention of using third-person plural pronouns (‘they,’ ‘them,’ etc.)
when referring to individual persons of unknown gender.
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and policy are concerned, and it grows out of the normative stance that judges
ought to think carefully and fairly about the matters before them and explain
their decisions in opinions that bear rational scrutiny.3 Assessing whether judges satisfy these goals presents problems. Knowing whether judges are considering matters before them fairly would require access to their mental processes.
We cannot see inside the “black box”4—the minds and thought processes of
judges—but we have reason to believe that they are subject to the same cognitive biases or heuristics as the rest of us.5
As for the rational scrutiny of opinions, they should provide evidence of
the fair consideration of the parties’ arguments and select from them arguments
supporting the decision, arguments that are cogent and free of significant error.6 A court’s opinion will likely cite and apply precedent cases, and “[i]n an
ideal world, the parties would present the court with the relevant cases and the
court would discuss those same relevant cases.”7 As studies over more than fifty years have shown, however, many citations in court opinions are endogenous.8 This Article will show that these endogenous citations represent a real
danger: a danger that a court supporting an argument by citing a case that it has
found and the parties have not briefed will make an error in legal reasoning that
is difficult and expensive for the parties to correct.
A key contribution of this Article will be to explain from the perspective of
argumentation theory—the philosophy of argumentation—the role of adversarial briefing when we want judges to make decisions rationally and justify them
cogently. As I will explain below, legal arguments—even those in deductive
form—are defeasible.9 Consider the alternative: when reasoners in geometry

3

See infra Part I; Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 494–95 (2009)
(“When the parties are well matched, and when they both have an interest in presenting all
the arguments in favor of their position, adversary process will produce the best possible judicial decision.”); see also infra Section I.A.
4 Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical
Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 940 (2007).
5 See infra Section I.A.
6 This does not guarantee that the decision was made fairly, but it seems at least to be a necessary condition.
7 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 106.
8 See id. at 69–75 (reporting results of previous studies of endogenous citations); id. at 84
(reporting that 51% of cases in opinions they studied were endogenous); see also infra Section II.A.
9 In argumentation theory, just as in property law, something that is defeasible stands until
and unless something comes along to defeat it. Brian Bix thus described a defeasible concept
as “subject to an analytical structure such that certain criteria justified the assertion of some
legal claim (like ‘valid contract’), but that claim might subsequently be defeated by the discovery of additional facts.” Brian H. Bix, Defeasibility and Open Texture, in THE LOGIC OF
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY 193, 197 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni
Battista Ratti eds. 2012) (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 175 (1948–49)). Pollock described reasoning as defeasible if
“the premises taken by themselves may justify us in accepting the conclusion, but when additional information is added, that conclusion may no longer be justified.” John L. Pollock,
Defeasible Reasoning, 11 COGNITIVE SCI. 481, 481 (1987); see also infra Section I.B.
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and other deductive sciences argue deductively, the truth of the major and minor premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. For example:
Major premise: All squares are rectangles.
Minor premise: ABCD is a square.
Conclusion: Therefore, ABCD is a rectangle.
If the premises are true, the conclusion must be. In fact, some theorists
doubt whether the conclusion is necessary, as it conveys no new information.10
Aristotle’s are the oldest extant works that describe forms of reasoning of this
kind.11 Even Aristotle, however, acknowledged that these forms of arguments
do not work exactly this way in arguments about human affairs.12
Consequently, when legal reasoners present arguments in the form of a legal deduction, they anticipate responses from their opponents that may, but
need not, attack the premises or the form of the argument. Opponents may instead supply new information that thoroughly rebuts the original arguments,
with any one of these ‘rebutters’ destroying any presumption of the original arguments’ acceptability. Opponents may also ask critical questions and supply
information that merely weakens an original argument, hoping that enough of
these ‘undercutters’ will cause the deduction to fall. All these efforts are themselves arguments of conventional forms: rule-based arguments, legal analogies
or examples, and policy-based arguments. And of course, each of those arguments potentially spawns its own counterarguments.
Consequently, legal reasoners must anticipate critical questions and counterarguments, a complex task. The task is more complex with legal analogies
and policy arguments than with rule-based arguments.13 Adversarial briefing
helps here in part because humans—in the form of attorneys as advocates—are
good at making arguments for their own positions, though they are bad at antic10

See Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes and Legal Analogy, 87
U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 683 (2019) (citing STEPHEN F. BARKER, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 224 (6th
ed. 2003)).
11 ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS 229 app. I (Robin Smith trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1989)
(c. 384 B.C.E.).
12 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, at 7–9 (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“We must therefore be content if, in dealing
with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting a broad
outline of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough
if we arrive at generally valid conclusions . . . . It is equally unreasonable to accept merely
probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.”); see Robin Smith, Notes to ARISTOTLE, supra note 11, at 105, 127; ARISTOTLE,
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 13 (Jonathan Barnes trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1993) (c. 384
B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 10 (Robin Smith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (c. 384
B.C.E.) (characterizing his subject of study as “dialectic problems”); Robin Smith, Commentary to TOPICS, supra, at 41, 56 (describing a dialectic problem as “a question which is both
important for some purpose and the subject of significant disagreement”); ARISTOTLE, ON
RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 39 (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. 2007) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (incorporating dialectic into his theory of rhetoric, calling
rhetoric an “offshoot” of dialectic and “partly” dialectic); id. at 47–48 (describing rhetoric as
the art focused on deliberative, judicial, and other civic assemblies in Athens).
13 See infra Section I.B.
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ipating those of the opposing side.14 They exhibit the confirmation and coherence biases. Humans—in the form of judges—are good at assessing arguments
so long they do so in a dialogical context where they are seeking the truth and
will be accountable for their decisions, and so long as they have not prejudged
the issue. There is evidence that in this situation, the judges can reduce the effects of confirmation bias and related cognitive heuristics.15
The judge who builds an argument using cases that the parties have not
briefed risks overlooking key potential counterarguments and remains more
vulnerable to cognitive biases. A judge’s mistake comes with a high cost to
correct. Fixing an error requires a motion to reconsider, which is unlikely to
work given the judge has already committed to the original decision, or an appeal, which is also unlikely to work.16 In either case, the cost in time and money to the parties and the court makes correcting an error much more expensive
than avoiding one.
Based on this analysis, judges should be shy of using endogenous cases to
support their arguments because they are not in a good position to anticipate
the counterarguments that advocates might have interposed if they had had the
chance to brief the cases. Judges—like other humans—are more likely to
achieve a just outcome by evaluating arguments in support of the parties’ positions, rather than constructing arguments to support their own positions. This
functions as an effective “division of cognitive labor”17 in a rational legal system.
A concern with justice also no doubt motivates judges who use endogenous cases: ‘If the parties have not found the right cases,’ a judge might say,
‘then it’s my job to find and apply them.’ My proposal in no way prevents
judges and their clerks from doing independent research. Instead, it calls on the
judge to use oral argument as an opportunity to explore cases the parties have
not cited in their briefs. In this way, the judge rehabilitates an endogenous case
into one the application of which the parties have had a chance to argue.18
I have found no evidence that judges receive criticism in general for using
endogenous cases. Professor Maggie Gardner’s recent article comes close to
such a criticism but does not directly address endogenous citations; it does,
however, counsel against district-court judges and their clerks citing to other
14

Section I.A., infra, provides substantive support for this position and the rest of this paragraph. One reviewer commented that the focus of his first-year law-school pedagogy is to
get students to recognize and respond to objections, and from the tone of his comment, I
suspect that he feels his work is successful. That is not inconsistent with the assertions here.
When law professors ask students to identify and make objections, they are in effect training
them to be judges; the students do not have a stake in the cases they read in the same ways
that lawyers working for a client have. As the research below suggests, however, once the
students have a position they must defend, they will become less adept at recognizing counterarguments.
15 See infra Section I.A.
16 See infra Section I.C.
17 Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 57, 65 (2011).
18 See infra Part III.
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district-court cases without following certain safeguards.19 From the perspective of practical norms—the conduct of judges that is typical and passes without opprobrium from other judges—endogenous citations seem just fine.20 This
Article will consider the use of endogenous citations in court opinions, however, from a metanormative perspective, asking ‘Should judges use endogenous
cases?’21
The answer is not a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ I show in this study that judges’
opinions vary widely, with some using no endogenous cases, and others using
only endogenous cases. In at least some situations, we can see why the judge
resorts to endogenous cases. And the remedy to endogenous cases, to the extent
they require one, is to give the parties a chance to brief or argue the significance of those cases. This Article will offer practical ways to make that possible. Judges and their clerks should still hunt for the correct law to apply to the
case; they should just not presume to have a monopoly on finding it.
In Part I, I will present the cognitive and philosophical dimensions of legal
decision-making. This Article will make a significant contribution by explaining in detail the structure of defeasible legal deductions and analogies and the
bases for defeating them. It will show that certain arguments are more complex
than others. Based on this analysis, it would be best to avoid all endogenous
citations, but some endogenous citations are more dangerous than others.
Part II will provide a more detailed review of the research on endogenous
case uses, describe the materials and methods of this study, and present its findings. For this study, I examined fifty-five federal trial court opinions on dispositive motions in copyright cases between 2012 and 2018, along with all the
briefs that led to those opinions. Table 1 in the Appendix lists and provides full
citations for them. I segmented the arguments based on their main and subsidiary points and categorized the uses authors made of cited cases in each segment. I will present the findings first in terms of gross endogeneity of opinions—that is, the proportion of all case uses that were endogenous cases. Based
on the method used in this study, opinions exhibited average gross endogeneity
of 29%, near the low end of the range suggested in previous studies.22 But the
difference between that gross endogeneity and relative frequencies with which
judges used endogenous cases to support rule-based, legal analogy, and legal
policy arguments was negligible. Consequently, judges appear not to think that
endogenous cases are worse with certain types of arguments than others. This
19

Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1619, 1670–76 (2020) (offering specific interventions to address concerns the author concludes arise from district courts
citing other district courts).
20 I make this claim based upon the frequency with which judges use endogenous citations,
see infra Section II.A., and the paucity of literature criticizing judges for the practice.
21 See Larson, supra note 2, at 139. In an argumentation-theoretic sense, it is possible for an
argumentative practice to be widespread and acceptable among practitioners—practically
normative—but to be subject to criticism on metanormative grounds. Id.
22 As I note below, if I had calculated endogeneity the same way previous studies did, the
number here would have been higher, 38%, but it is still at the low end of previous studies.
See infra, Section II.D.
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Part will also explore whether there is a correlation between opinion endogeneity and the depth with which advocates briefed the issues and between endogeneity and the parties’ legal resources. The Part will conclude by exploring the
sources of cases that judges use for different types of arguments and their endogeneity. Here, we find that judges did engage in different practices depending on the type of legal argument—rule-based, legal analogy, or policybased—but the differences go the wrong way!
Part III will recognize a hierarchy of badness among endogenous case uses
and recommends ways for rehabilitating them. It will offer two key recommendations to judges: First, judges should use the most dangerous endogenous cases only when necessary to resolve the legal issues before them. Second, if
judges’ chambers locate endogenous cases to support legal analogies and policy arguments, the judges should give the parties’ advocates an opportunity to
respond to those cases (in a hearing or through briefing) before the court makes
its decision and writes its opinion. Part III will also address potential objections
to the practical recommendations and describe suggestions for future research.
Endogenous cases in court opinions can be dangerous—some more dangerous than others. With proper care, though, judges and the parties can rehabilitate endogenous cases to produce just outcomes and cogent justifications for
them.
I.

SOME LEGAL ARGUMENTS ARE MORE DEFEASIBLE THAN OTHERS

Federal civil litigation takes place within a broad, adversarial system for
the enforcement of laws by public and private actors within the United States.
Within that broader context, Susan Provenzano and I borrowed from contemporary argumentation theory and classical rhetoric to characterize the federal
civil suit as a “critical discussion,” where the entire case constitutes a single argument on one level, and the case exhibits various stopping points or stases.23
Each stasis is a decision point, where the judge must apply law to facts and determine the outcome when one party to the litigation demands a judgment from
the court on some question—perhaps a particular one, like an evidential ruling
or a motion to compel certain disclosures, or perhaps a broader, dispositive
one, like a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment—with each stasis
providing an opportunity for the parties to make arguments to the judge.24
Judges should assess stases impartially and intelligently after giving parties
the chance to be heard. The ABA’s Black Letter Guidelines for the Evaluation
of Judicial Performance assert that a “judge should be evaluated on [their] integrity and impartiality, including . . . [c]onsideration of both sides of an argument before rendering a decision.”25 The philosophy that undergirds contemporary argumentation theory also supports the notion that, during a stasis, both
23

Susan E. Provenzano & Brian N. Larson, Civil Procedure as a Critical Discussion, 20
NEV. L.J. 967, 1022 (2020).
24 The theory of stases has its roots in classical judicial or forensic rhetoric. Id. at 1022–23.
25 AM. BAR ASS’N, BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE § 5-2.5, at 3 (2005) (emphasis added).
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parties should have opportunities to offer argumentation to the judge in support
of their positions.26 The philosophical principles hold for any dispute before
any tribunal.27
Advocates of adversary process believe “the sharp clash of proofs” it presents “is most likely” to result in a “resolution of a litigated dispute acceptable
to both the parties and society.”28 Such assertions are in part conventional wisdom and in part expression of support for the system that we have, whether the
evidence we have clearly supports them or not.29 This precept finds support,
too, in the U.S. Constitution.30 Not surprisingly, however, there are many critics of adversarial process.31 The criticisms are well taken, and judges and legal
26

See Provenzano & Larson, supra note 23, at 1016–17.
See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 842–43 (1985). The study in this Article considers disputes under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but its arguments relate to any kind of tribunal that uses prior case opinions
in its reasoning. As the literature debating the merits of the adversarial system acknowledges, criminal proceedings may warrant a different approach given the power of the state and
the strong presumption of innocence. Id. One could extend that argument to include other
types of proceedings, like those involving child welfare and custody, where values and presumptions other than those in civil litigation may be at play.
28 STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 2 (1988).
29 But see generally id. 28(acknowledging shortcomings of the adversary system but byand-large adopting a laudatory stance toward it).
30 Id. at 37 (noting that for civil cases, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ promises of
due process “have been viewed as requiring a fair trial in a fair forum in both civil and criminal cases”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (“[A]bsent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty
through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”); Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“The fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914))).
31 A great many of the criticisms fall into two broad categories: the fairness and efficiency
of litigation writ large and the adversarial process’s failure to expose material truth. See
LANDSMAN, supra note 28, at 21, 25–26, 30–31 (admitting adversary process slows down
adjudication of disputes, it benefits lawyers, who spend more time (and clients’ money) preparing for battles in the courtroom or on briefs, and it may deny justice to those who cannot
afford lawyers); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 571–81 (2013) (showing that lawyers unconsciously
delay settlements based on cognitive heuristics and biases to which humans generally are
vulnerable); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982) (arguing
that the shift of judges from adjudicating claims to managing processes, including discovery,
in a highly adversarial environment results in the judge engaging with the parties in the litigation process in early stages, thus “learn[ing] more about cases much earlier than they did
in the past”); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1261, 1261–62 (2010) (arguing that the contemporary “managerial judge” may subject
even the trial to similar influences and biases); LANDSMAN, supra note 28, at 3, 25 (noting
that judges’ “neutrality and passivity . . . tends to commit the adversary system to the objective of resolving disputes rather than searching for material truth”); id. at 26–30 (offering his
own rejoinder to this criticism); Langbein, supra note 27, at 844–45 (pointing to the ability
of litigants to interact with witnesses and seek partisan experts in establishing matters of
fact); Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary
System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 313,
315–16 (1991) (claiming a lawyer’s advice may cause clients “to withhold or suppress evi27
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scholars are right to seek resolution or correction of them; they do not, however, reach the opportunity for parties to be heard—to offer argumentation supporting their positions—at the stases where the court must apply the law to
some facts, however it ascertained the latter.32 “[T]he public’s perception of the
fairness and legitimacy of the legal process turns, in substantial part, on whether the public believes that those who will be affected have a fair opportunity to
have their voices heard and their arguments considered before the court reaches
a final decision.”33 The “biases” of a “solitary judge . . . can easily influence
the decisions she renders.”34
It is these biases that I shall take up in Section A, considering how to ensure that judges’ decisions in the adversary process have rational bases.35 I then
proceed in Section B to a signature contribution of this Article, focusing on the
stasis level and describing the form of legal-deduction and legal-analogy arguments as argumentation schemes and explaining the counterarguments or critical questions available to defeat them. Based on that discussion, Section C urges that adversarial briefing on what the law is and how it applies to the facts is
more critical in certain situations than others and that a judge should allow the
parties an opportunity to respond to the judge’s planned use of a cited case particularly in those situations.

dence,” and the lawyer may be party to withholding evidence, “presenting documents or testimony” they believe “to be false,” “discrediting . . . witnesses” who are “truthful,” and “arguing for inferences from the evidence that . . . are unwarranted”).
32 Langbein, supra note 27, at 841–42 (criticizing deeply the adversary gaming of witnesses
and experts, but frankly acknowledging that adversary argumentation makes sense outside
the context of “fact-gathering” and in the context of “the rest of civil litigation”; referring
specifically to the role of the parties in directing German inquisitorial judges onto certain
lines of factual inquiry and in interpreting the facts those judges have found).
33 Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 983 (2009). Though they do not ground their comments in cognitive science, adversary theorists recognize “that if the decision maker strays from the passive role, she runs a serious risk of prematurely committing herself to one or another version
of the facts and of failing to appreciate the value of all the evidence.” LANDSMAN, supra note
28, at 2.
34 LANDSMAN, supra note 28, at 3.
35 The extent to which this is possible has been subjected to vigorous debate at least since
the advent of American Legal Realism. Compare Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in
Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6889–90, 6892 (2011) (examining a
large number of decisions in a class of very similar cases, noting differences in outcomes
between those that had happened just before a meal break and those happening just after),
with Craig E. Jones, The Troubling New Science of Legal Persuasion: Heuristics and Biases
in Judicial Decision-Making, 41 ADVOCS. Q. 49, 70–72, 71 n.64 (2013) (reporting challenges to the Danziger et al. study and its authors’ efforts to respond to them). I proceed here on
the assumption that rational decision-making is at least an aspiration, without making any
claims as to how possible it is to achieve.
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A. Counteracting Cognitive Biases/Heuristics
American judges are human beings,36 and they judge within the complex
social structure of our legal system and courts. This Section argues they are
likely subject to the same cognitive biases or heuristics37 as other humans and
that adversarial briefing can help to counteract resulting problems. In the legal
context, Brandon Bartels has described two models of judicial decisionmaking, contrasting the “systematic,” which is “active and effortful processing
of relevant stimuli and information in a decision context,” and the “heuristic,”
which is “low-effort, passive processing, where individuals may skim over important stimuli and information and rely on more peripheral decision cues.”38
These “dual-process models . . . distinguish between intuitions and reasoning.”39 A system of laws would benefit, on Bartels’s account, from more systematic reasoning. In heuristic processing, “the theories and predispositions
people bring to a judgment context produce a biasing influence on how they
process the relevant facts and information.”40
Some have taken the position that judges may be better thinkers or decision-makers than laypeople, and thus less vulnerable to top-down or biased decision-making.41 Unfortunately, there is evidence that judges are not better at
36

To my knowledge, no study has empirically confirmed this assertion, but some other
folks have claimed it, too. Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 103, 103 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell
eds., 2010); Anne E. Mullins, Source-Relational Ethos in Judicial Opinions, 54 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1089, 1102, 1120 (2019).
37 I take ‘bias’ and ‘heuristic’ here to mean the same thing. “[T]he human mind evolved as a
toolbox, a set of capacities, to survive in certain environments,” including “heuristics, ‘fast
and frugal’ techniques for drawing conclusions or inferences about our environments that are
not necessarily rational in any substantive sense.” Brian N. Larson, Bridging Rhetoric and
Pragmatics with Relevance Theory, in RELEVANCE AND IRRELEVANCE: THEORIES, FACTORS
AND CHALLENGES 69, 76 (Jan Strassheim & Hisashi Nasu eds., 2018) (quoting Gerd
Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences, 1 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 107, 109 (2009)). Such tools can, however, be “ecological[ly] rational[],” if used in adaptively appropriate environments. Gigerenzer & Brighton,
supra, at 111–12. Thus, “bias refers to a judgment tendency which may be right or wrong,
beneficial or harmful depending on environmental context.” Eric Schulz et al., Persistent
Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise
Defense, 20 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 1722, 1723 (2011).
38 Brandon L. Bartels, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Judicial Reasoning, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 36, at 41, 43. Stanovich and West
were probably the first to refer to this distinction as “System 1” (heuristic) and “System 2”
(consciously rational). Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. 645, 658 (2000)
(characterizing the earlier literature on “two-process theories of reasoning”).
39 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 17, at 58, and sources cited therein.
40 Bartels, supra note 38, at 43. This may be true in part because humans did not evolve to
be judges at law or equity, and because heuristic or biased decision-making in that context is
not “ecological[ly] rational[].” See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 37.
41 See Wendy L. Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 36, at 73, 77. Schauer argues that we should not assume that judges are not better at certain tasks than other humans. Schauer, supra note 36, at
106–07, 111–13.
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reaching decisions about evidence.42 For example, one study showed judges
were significantly more vulnerable to confirmation bias—people’s tendency to
“seek out information consistent with what they already believe”—than attorneys, and not significantly less vulnerable than laypeople.43 Even those who
acknowledge judges may be no better than laypeople at “fact-focused inquiries” consider it possible that they are better at the parts of judicial decisionmaking “that are more or less the exclusive province of the judge”: “selecting
the relevant law, interpreting the law, and sometimes making law.”44 Other
scholars express doubts that judges’ methods of reasoning are different than
other humans.45

42

See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001) (presenting findings of an empirical study); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (presenting findings of
empirical study and concluding “judges are predominantly intuitive [meaning heuristic] decision makers, and intuitive judgments are often flawed”); see also Emily Sherwin, Features
of Judicial Reasoning, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 36,
at 121, 122 (noting that judges are at least to some extent vulnerable to the same biases as
other humans).
43 Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 3131, at 593–94 (noting, too, that attorneys were less
vulnerable than the general public).
44 Schauer, supra note 3636, at 104 (“[M]uch of the current research on the psychology of
judging has usefully cast doubt on the view that judges by virtue of their intelligence or legal
training or judicial position could significantly outperform juries with respect to the same
fact-focused inquiries.”). Schauer asks “whether the experience of studying to be a lawyer
and then of practicing law causes decision making in law, especially about legal (as opposed
to factual) matters, to diverge in deep and cognitively substantial ways from the decision
making of” laypeople. Id. at 105. He suggests that judges may be better at these tasks than
other humans, that the judge’s experiences may “generate process- and not just contentbased differences between the cognitive mechanisms of judges and those of nonjudge humanity.” Id.; see also Anne E. Mullins, Opportunity in the Age of Alternative Facts, 58
WASHBURN L.J. 577, 579 (2019) (examining law school curricula and judicial education
programs and finding little evidence of training in things like empirical methodology or cognitive theory to promote better decision-making).
45 Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 249, 261–62 (2017); Sherwin, supra note 4242, at 123 (“Neither moral reasoning nor empirical and inductive reasoning, however, is peculiar to . . . law. They operate in
adjudication just as they operate in any decision-making context. The important psychological questions for law are about the extent to which judges can resist or counteract the biases
that affect ordinary reasoners.”); Dan Simon, In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism: Pitfalls and
Opportunities in the Psychology of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING, supra note 36, at 131, 141 (arguing that the experimental context of psychological
studies has not prevented them being predictive of human behavior outside the lab and that
judges are thus as likely influenced by “coherence effects” as other humans). Compare Dan
M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 354–55 (2016) (reporting an experimental study where judges and attorneys outperformed law students and
lay-people in resisting application of their political biases to decision-making), with Holger
Spamann & Lars Klöhn, Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, Than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 256 (2016) (reporting
an experimental study showing that “[r]eal judges” did not rely on briefs but instead on polarizing characteristics of parties in deciding cases).
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Worse, evidence suggests that certain cognitive biases, and particularly the
confirmation bias, have a stronger effect on those who are “intellectually more
sophisticated” and those with “increased argumentative sophistication.”46 So,
for example, “while more intelligent subjects are better at coming up with arguments for their own side of an argument than less intelligent subjects, they
are not much better than them at coming up with arguments for the side opposing their view.”47 This is ‘motivated reasoning,’ as that term is defined below.48
Judges who must apply precedent cases as legal analogies face a double
cognitive challenge: the first is retrieving the analogous case and the second is
mapping the deeper, legally relevant similarities (or dissimilarities) between the
cases.49 Judges and their clerks have access to sophisticated legal research tools
that make finding and retrieving possible analogues relatively easy. But judges
must still identify the found analogues as good ones and draw comparisons,
and their own unconscious biases probably limit their efforts to do so.50 A
number of motivations could also cause judges and their clerks to select potentially analogous cases hastily and analyze them with insufficient care.51 A third
cognitive challenge awaits those judges who adhere to the perspective that a
rule must accompany each legal analogy, a “covering rule” that applies deductively to the cited case and the present case.52 When attempting to formulate
46

Uwe Peters, Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy, 34 MIND
& LANGUAGE 393, 405 (2019) (also citing evidence that philosophers are “especially prone
to the bias”). Claims that philosophers are resistant to cognitive biases based on their “expert
knowledge” are not a persuasive counterargument. See Schulz et al., supra note 37, at 1723,
1729 (presenting findings showing that philosophers’ acceptance of a theory of free will and
determinism (“compatibilism”) was related to an inherited social characteristic (“extraversion”) after accounting for the philosophers’ expert knowledge of the free-will debate).
47 Peters, supra note 46, at 405.
48 See infra, text accompanying note 61.
49 Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING, supra note 36, at 149, 150–51; Schauer & Spellman, supra note 45, at
253–54; Kristen Konrad Tiscione, Feelthinking Like a Lawyer: The Role of Emotion in Legal Reasoning and Decision-making, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1159, 1191 (2019). Braman
and Nelson found in an experimental study that “participants with diverging opinions saw
the very same [precedent] cases in systematically different ways” with “the differential perception of precedent by decision makers with varying policy preferences serv[ing] as a
mechanism of motivated reasoning in legal decision making.” Braman & Nelson, supra note
4, at 954.
50 “[U]nconscious remindings of known analogs that are not present can affect judgments
even though, when made explicit, the analogs are not viewed as any better or worse than
other ones.” Spellman, supra note 4949, at 162. A judge “might be more likely to unintentionally find in a direction consistent with past judgments—in part because of what they see
as more (or less) similar, in part because of the level of abstraction . . . , and in part because
of an effort to maintain coherence in their beliefs.” Id. at 162–63.
51 Gardner, supra note 19, at 1659–63.
52 LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 61 (2d
ed. 2016) (defining “covering rule”). The perspective of some is that such a covering rule is
required for legal analogies to have rational force. Brewer, supra note 2, at 992. Sunstein
expresses a contrary view, advocating for judicial minimalism, judges trying to “decide cases rather than . . . set down broad rules,” and making “concrete judgments on particular cases, unaccompanied by abstract accounts about what accounts for [these] judgments.” CASS
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such a rule, the judge has at their disposal a variety of levels of abstraction at
which to situate the rule—as a broad or narrow one.53
Thus, the jury is out on whether judges are less vulnerable to cognitive biases than laypeople, in general or in the law. I maintain that the evidence available gives reason to doubt that claim, and our legal system should protect litigants from that risk. But what can judges do to mitigate their cognitive biases if
they do exist?
Professors Mercier and Sperber, in a provocative essay, argued that human
reasoning evolved as an adaptation to support and reinforce argumentative exchanges in social contexts—what they call the argumentative theory of reasoning.54 They adopted the dual-process model discussed above.55 Onto this, however, they mapped two concepts: inferences and arguments. Inferences, which
derive from intuitive processes, generate “intuitive beliefs,” beliefs at which
one arrives without the necessity of any reasoning.56 Arguments are series of
propositions, the content and structure of which are themselves the product of
inferences, but with each argument including a proposition that the others in
the series support.57 On this account, only the arguments themselves produce
“reflective beliefs,” the product of “reasoning proper.”58 Mercier and Sperber
identified several falsifiable hypotheses derived from their theory and presented evidence from psychology and cognitive science consistent with the hypotheses.59 First, “reasoning used to produce argument should exhibit a strong confirmation bias.”60 Second, “when people reason on their own about one of their
opinions, they are likely to do so proactively, that is, anticipating a dialogic
context, and mostly to find arguments that support their opinion”; this is “motivated reasoning.”61 Third, in superficially rational decision-making, “reasoning
will drive people towards decisions for which they can argue—decisions that
they can justify—even if these decisions are not optimal.”62

R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 10, 13
(1999) (emphasis omitted).
53 Larson, supra note 10, at 680–81 (citing Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV.
571, 577, 582, 591 (1987)).
54 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 17, at 58 (“We outline an approach to reasoning based on
the idea that the primary function for which it evolved is the production and evaluation of
arguments in communication.”).
55 Id.
56 Id. (“People may be aware of having reached a certain conclusion . . . but . . . they are
never aware of the process itself. All inferences carried out by inferential mechanisms are in
this sense intuitive. They generate intuitive beliefs; that is, beliefs held without awareness of
reasons to hold them.”).
57 Id. at 58–59.
58 Id. at 58.
59 Id. at 61–71.
60 Id. at 61.
61 Id. (emphasis omitted).
62 Id.
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The dark side of this theory is thus that people reason principally to justify
argumentatively the inferences that they have already reached.63 It reinforces
concerns about judges’ reasoning described above. Previous research also suggests, however, that a reasoner may reduce the effects of these cognitive and
argumentative biases: with proper motivation, accountability, and a little help
from others. For example, Bartels asserted that judges can “overcome [these]
potential biasing influences” with cognitive self-discipline, but others have
suggested the matter is more complicated.64 Identifying and overcoming one’s
biases, however, requires motivation in the judge because systematic processing requires more work.65 Getting judges to engage in systematic processing requires that they be accountable—one function of the writing of opinions in which they explain their judgments—and that they have the necessary
“time and resources.”66 Mercier and Sperber agreed that decision-makers need
to be motivated to take advantage of the more powerful reasoning ability they
have in argumentative contexts, but they conclude, too, that the involvement of
others in that context is necessary to assure the best outcomes.67 Mercier and
Sperber noted that “people are quite capable of reasoning in an unbiased manner . . . when they are evaluating arguments rather than producing them, and
when they are after the truth rather than trying to win a debate.”68 Thus, placing
the judge in a position where they receive parties’ arguments and evaluate
them, rather than producing arguments to justify the judge’s own intuitive inferences, should lead to cognitively better results.
63

Cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 74, 80–81 (1983) (showing that experimental subjects invested deeper thought
into adopting a decision when they were aware that they would have to explain or justify
their decision to an audience whose position on the issue was not known in advance); Philip
E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error, 48 SOC.
PSYCH. Q. 227, 227, 233 (1985) (showing that experimental subjects were not vulnerable to
a cognitive heuristic—“fundamental attribution error”—when they knew in advance of
forming their opinions that they would need to be able to justify them).
64 Compare Bartels, supra note 38, at 44, with Ron Ritchhart & David N. Perkins, Learning
to Think: The Challenges of Teaching Thinking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING
AND REASONING 775, 777, 780 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005) (explaining that efforts to teach critical thinking and reasoning result in “impacts on learners’ thinking [that] are typically moderate rather than huge,” and effects that “taper[] off after a period
of months or years”). See generally Daniel T. Willingham, Critical Thinking: Why Is It So
Hard to Teach?, 109 ARTS EDUC. POL’Y REV. 21 (2008) (discussing the complexity of teaching critical thinking); see id. at 26 (identifying hopes for progress where those learning have
domain knowledge and experience, as judges typically do).
65 Bartels, supra note 38, at 45; Mercier & Sperber, supra note 17, at 61 (“[W]hen they are
motivated, [experimental] participants are able to use reasoning to evaluate arguments accurately.” (emphasis omitted)).
66 Note that accountability can be counter-productive, though, where a reasoner has tentatively expressed commitment to a conclusion. Mercier & Sperber, supra note 17, at 67 (discussing “bolstering,” where “reasoning [is] even more biased once the reasoner has already
stated her opinion, thereby increasing the pressure on her to justify it rather than moving
away from it,” and noting that accountability actually increases bolstering (emphasis omitted)); Bartels, supra note 38, at 45–46.
67 Mercier & Sperber, supra note 17, at 72.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
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Because judges are expected to be impartial—that is, they are expected not
to have pre-judged the matter—and parties’ attorneys are charged with a duty
to zealously represent their clients’ positions, there is no social pressure for advocates to agree with a judge’s instinctual position regarding a legal matter.
They can therefore produce the best possible arguments for their positions and
put the judge in a position to evaluate them as arguments. Our system should
rely on judges who assess the arguments of the parties and adopt a decision
based upon them.69 If another potential basis for decision occurs to the court, it
should give the parties the chance to explain how the court should apply that
authority. The resulting decision should be less biased, and as we shall see in
the next Section, the resulting opinion should give better evidence of that process and better justification of the decision.
B. Legal Arguments Are Defeasible
Legal arguments are always defeasible,70 and they always anticipate a response: in the case of a stasis or decision point before a judge, moving parties
expect their arguments in support of their motions will face opposition from
non-moving parties. Even a judge’s opinion—their argumentation in support of
their decision—is subject to a response if the non-prevailing party moves for
reconsideration or appeals the decision. A non-prevailing party may respond
even to the decision of a court of last resort by seeking remedial legislation or a
constitutional amendment.

69

One commentor on an earlier draft of this paper noted that this proposal is an ideal and
that it might be unlikely or impossible for judges to withhold judgment until they have first
fairly considered the arguments of the parties, referring to the oft-cited discussion of the judicial “hunch” by Joseph Hutcheson. Joseph C. Hutcherson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The
Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 274 (1929). But even
Hutcheson’s paean (it was a dithyramb, really, given its ecstatic bent) to the hunch does not
license premature decision-making. Id. at 280 (“[A]fter ‘having well and exactly seen and
surveyed, overlooked, reviewed, read and read over again’ etc., all of the briefs, authorities
and the record, [I] would wait awhile before deciding to give my mind a chance to hunch it
out.”).
70 See Bix, supra note 9, at 193. The term finds its origin in this sense in the work of H.L.A.
Hart, who “indicated that he was using the term as an extension of an idea from property
law, whereby a legal interest in land could be subject to termination or defeat under certain
contingencies, but would remain valid if those contingencies did not come about.” Bix, supra note 9, at 197 n.24 (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 175 (1948–49)). In jurisprudence, the objects of defeasibility can
be the legal concepts, the legal argumentation, or both. Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti, Defeasibility and Legality: A Survey, in THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS:
ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY, supra note 9, at 11, 14 (citing N. Bobbio, Diritto e Logica, reprinted in CONTRIBUTI AD UN DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO 115 (1994)). In this Article, I refer specifically to the defeasibility of legal argumentation rather than of legal principles, standards,
norms, or rules, which I collectively call ‘concepts’ here. Nevertheless, as the critical questions below illustrate, attempting to defeat a legal argument sometimes involves bringing
into question such concepts. Whether law is conceptually defeasible as an ontological matter
is a discussion for another time; practically, however, I assert that lawyers and judges commonly make arguments as if legal concepts are defeasible in fact, if not ideally.
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Judicial opinions depend in part for their legitimacy on being cogent. “[A]
cogent argument has ‘premises which are acceptable to the audience to whom it
is addressed, relevant to its conclusion, and sufficient to warrant belief in its
conclusion.’ ”71 There can be little doubt that judicial opinions should be held
to the standard of cogency. Cogency provides a different standard than validity
and soundness in formal logic. There, validity of an argument is associated
with the rational force of its logical form, “the degree to which the
form . . . yields a reliable judgment about the truth of its conclusion based on
the assumed truth of its premises.”72 At the apex of rational force is the deduction, a form that compels the truth of the conclusion if the truth of the premises
is assumed or accepted.73 The geometry deduction in the introduction is a good
example.
Formal logical analysis can be useful in the law, of course.74 In the law,
however, even deductive arguments are defeasible, as Subsection 1 shows.
Constructing a legal deduction, which requires anticipating the objections likely to be raised against it, opens the door to more argumentation in a way that
logical deduction does not. The claims that might defeat a deductive argument
come in two varieties, and they spawn their own arguments, some more complex than others. Arguments by legal analogy and policy arguments are in this
sense more defeasible than legal deductions, as Subsection 2 shows.75 Section
C proposes that this graduated scale of defeasibility generates a graduated need
for adversarial briefing, especially when considering the difficulty of responding to the arguments in a judicial opinion.
1. Legal Deductions Are Defeasible
The form of a legal argument never guarantees the cogency of the conclusion: even if it is in deductive form and the premises are true, the answers to
certain critical questions are liable to defeat it. Consider this legal deduction
under the statutes of the hypothetical State of Springer.

71

Larson, supra note 10, at 694 (quoting TRUDY GOVIER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT
119 (1999)). Govier is among philosophers in the “informal logic” movement. Id. at 695–96.
72 Brewer, supra note 2, at 928 (emphasis omitted).
73 See id. at 943.
74 Consider the example of a court that identifies a fallacious reasoning form, denying the
antecedent, in a lawyer’s argument. E.g., Larson, supra note 10, at 677.
75 I established in a sample of court opinions and briefs from which they resulted that the
authors used citations to cases in three substantive, rational ways: to support rule-based or
deductive arguments, to support arguments by example or legal analogies, and to support
policy-based arguments. Larson, supra note 2, at 166–67. Subsections 1 and 2 explore the
first two in some detail. This Article leaves the third to future work.
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ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION: STATE V. BOOSTRIDER76
Major Premise:

Minor Premise:
Conclusion:

According to Springer statutes section 15.15, any person who operates a vehicle in a municipal park is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Ms. Boostrider operated a vehicle in a municipal park.
Ms. Boostrider is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

This argument instantiates a general argumentative form, represented here
as an argumentation scheme. “Argumentation schemes are formal abstractions
of types of argument that are commonly used in natural-language discourse,
like legal arguments. In the conception used here, each argumentation scheme
consists of a set of premises and the conclusion they support, much like the valid deductive form above.”77
ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION
Major Premise:
Minor Premise:
Conclusion:

According to legal authority J, in every instance with features
ƒ1 . . . ƒn, legal category A applies.
The instant case has features ƒ1 . . . ƒn.
Legal category A applies in the instant case.

“[O]nce an argument’s proponent constructs it according to a valid argumentation scheme, its conclusion is presumptively acceptable, and the burden
shifts to the argument’s opponent to defeat or weaken it.”78 If these premises
are true, they function as good reasons to believe the conclusion, what some
philosophers refer to as “prima facie reasons.”79 Here, the ‘opponent’ for an
argument proposed by an advocate is the opposing party’s advocate or the
judge, who must subject the argument to critical scrutiny; for an argument proposed by a judge in an opinion, the parties, appellate courts, legal scholars, and
the public may submit it to scrutiny and may be ‘opponents’ for this purpose.
Note that this acceptability functions only as a practically normative assessment of the argumentation’s linguistic form in a dialogical context, not whether
it convinces or should convince a judge in a metanormatively idealized context.
An opponent challenges an argument or submits it to critical scrutiny by pursuing one or more critical questions. For arguments by legal deduction, the following critical questions apply.

76

Adapted from Larson, supra note 10, at 698.
Id. at 697. I have shown elsewhere that these argumentation schemes accompanied by
critical questions are a necessary and sufficient tool for making and assessing legal argumentation. Id. at 700.
78 Id. at 697. Of course, this shifting of burdens is not the same as shifting a burden of
pleading, production, or proof in the sense of civil or criminal procedure. It is rather the
shifting of a conventional or conversational burden in the dialog between the speakers.
79 Pollock, supra note 9, at 484.
77
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL DEDUCTION80
CQ1

Deductive Rule
Question:

CQ2

Instant Features
Question:
CQ2A:

CQ3
CQ4
CQ5

CQ6
CQ7

CQ2B:
Jurisdiction
Question:
Authority
Question:
Exception Rule
Question:
Exception Analogy
Question:
Exception Policy
Question:

Does legal authority J actually say that legal category
A applies in every instance with features ƒ1 . . . ƒn?
That is, is the legal rule advanced a deductive one?
Does instant case have features ƒ1 . . . ƒn? For each
feature ƒx:
Has any legal authority defined feature ƒx or narrowed
or expanded its definition?
On the record in the case, is feature ƒx present?
Does legal authority J have authority over the persons
or things in the instant case?
Does legal authority J govern the law applicable in the
instant case?
Has any legal authority identified an exception to the
rule in the presence of features g1 . . . gn—features present here?
Is there any previous similar case where the rule was
not applied?
Does the policy underlying the rule suggest that an exception to the rule should exist in the presence of features g1 . . . gn—features present here?

Figure 1 shows a series of possible defeater81 arguments relating to the
State v. Boostrider legal deduction above and arising from the critical questions
for the legal-deduction argumentation scheme. The critical questions give rise
to arguments that fall into two categories: rebutting defeaters (depicted in Figures 1 and 2 with a skull and crossbones) and undercutting defeaters (depicted
with a parrying fencer).82 Rebutting defeaters grow out of critical questions
CQ1 through CQ5. Certain arguments arising from these questions can entirely
destroy the presumption of acceptability that attached to the original argument,
shifting the burden back to the argument’s proponent to offer new argumentation in support of the conclusion, if that is possible. Some rebutting defeaters
80

Adapted from Larson, supra note 10, at 699, but revised to reflect the analytical framework here.
81 Pollock offered a narrower definition of defeaters as propositions that do not logically
contradict the premises but add new information; so he puts it this way, formally: “[Proposition] R is a defeater for [proposition] P as a prima facie reason for [conclusion] Q if and only
if P is a reason for [the reasoner] S to believe Q and R is logically consistent with P but (P &
R) is not a reason for S to believe Q.” Pollock, supra note 9, at 484 (second emphasis added). If P were a premise, a denial of the premise would be logically (or shall we say, deductively) inconsistent with it, and Pollock probably would not consider it a defeater.
82 Pollock’s distinction was slightly different: “[Defeater] R is a rebutting defeater for
[premise] P as a prima facie reason for [conclusion] Q if and only if [proposition] R is a defeater and R is a reason for believing [not-]Q.” Pollock, supra note 9, at 485. But “R is an
undercutting defeater for P as a prima facie reason for [reasoner] S to believe Q if and only
if R is a defeater and R is a reason for denying that P wouldn’t be true unless Q were true.”
Id. Complicated double negatives, I know, but in simplified form, rebutters are reasons to
disbelieve the conclusion Q, and undercutting defeaters are reasons to doubt the logical connection between the premise(s) and the conclusion.
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attack the original premises, while others provide additional information to defeat the original arguments.
FIGURE 1: ARGUMENTATION SCHEME AND EXAMPLE DEFEATER ARGUMENTS FOR LEGAL
DEDUCTION

So, for example, in the Boostrider case, if it turns out the legal rule asserted is not of universal application—if, for example, it has another element that
the prosecutor omitted (Figure 1, examples 1 and 2)—the major premise of the
original argument is rebutted, and the argumentative burden shifts back to the

22 NEV. L.J. 739

758

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

prosecutor. That additional element might appear in the statute, or an authoritative court may have held it was implied.83 Similarly, if the statute or an authoritative case defines one or more of the elements in such a way as to exclude Ms.
Boostrider’s conduct (Figure 1, examples 3 and 4), the premise of the original
argument is rebutted, destroying the presumption of acceptability, again shifting the argumentative burden back to the prosecutor.84
These attacks on the original argument focus on its premises. They are
principally rule-based in form and arise from legal authorities that are at once
fairly straightforward to find and require little interpretive effort to apply to the
facts of the instant case.
Question CQ2 can give rise to a different attack on the minor premise,
however, one where, for example, a previous court opinion held that the defendant was not operating a vehicle under circumstances similar to those in the
instant case (Figure 1, example 5). If that court did not articulate a universal or
“universalizable”85 rule as its holding but adopted a more minimalist judging
approach through reasoning by analogy to previous cases, the form of this defeater argument would itself be a legal analogy.86 Consequently, it would be up
to the judge in the instant case whether the legal analogy rebuts the minor
premise of the original argument. This counterargument thus functions as an
undercutter and not a rebutter. As Section C shows, an advocate or judge can
draw from a much broader base of authorities to construct analogies, including
non-binding cases, cases from other jurisdictions, and even cases from different
legal domains.
In short, the proponents of the original argument face a much greater challenge anticipating the legal analogies that might be offered to defeat it than
they do anticipating the rule-based defeaters. The more an argumentation
scheme is subject to undercutting by legal analogies, the more motivated and
resourceful the original argument’s proponents must be to anticipate defeaters
and construct an argument that will withstand them; and the more likely the
original argument’s proponent is to overlook a defeater.

83

See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918), in which the
Supreme Court read the word “reasonable” into the Sherman Act. If the court that adopted
the view that there is an implied element is not binding on the instant case, this would be an
undercutting, not a rebutting, defeater; the instant case’s judge would have to decide whether
there is good reason to adopt that rule.
84 If the court that defined an element in this way is not binding on the instant case, this
would be an undercutting, not a rebutting defeater. The instant case’s judge would have to
decide whether there is good reason to adopt that rule.
85 I use this latter term with the same qualifications offered for it by MacCormick. NEIL
MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 91–95
(2005). His treatment of this term in contradistinction to “generalization” fits with the defeasibility urged here, what he calls “defeasible universality.” Id. at 94. The implication is that
such universals are only qualifiedly universal; that a counterargument is always possible.
86 See the discussion of legal analogy in Section I.B.2., infra. I do not depend for my views
here on any a priori normative view that judges should or should not employ incrementalism
or minimalism. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text52.
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Critical questions CQ3 through CQ5 can give rise to arguments that rebut
the original argument by introducing new information, for example about a jurisdictional or subject-matter limitation (CQs 3 and 4; Figure 1, example, 6) or
about an exception to the rule created in an authoritative legal opinion (CQ 5;
Figure 1, example 7); each is a rebutting defeater that does not directly attack a
premise of the original argument but which, if well formed, functions to destroy the original argument’s presumption of acceptability.87
Critical questions CQ6 and CQ7 lead to development of undercutting defeaters: they give reasons not to accept the conclusion of the original argument
without entirely destroying its presumption of acceptability. Like the analogy
variant of CQ2, CQ6 looks for court opinions that excepted a defendant from
the rule in the original argument where the defendant has shared characteristics
with the defendant in the instant case (Figure 1, example 8). If the cited court
did not articulate a universal rule in its opinion, the defeater will be more or
less effective depending on how authoritative the case is and on whether the
original argument’s proponent can defeat the legal analogy in this counterargument as described in the next Section. Question CQ7 goes a step further
afield, inviting consideration of the policy underlying the rule to urge an exception to it (Figure 1, example 9). As we shall see below, a policy argument consists of a pair of related arguments and raises concerns of greater complexity.
In summary, a legal deduction is subject to counterarguments, defeaters
constructed based on the critical questions for the argumentation scheme. The
difficulty of constructing cogent arguments in the legal-deduction argumentation scheme is related to the difficulty of anticipating (and thus, constructing)
the defeaters that can be used against it. Several of these types of defeaters
(CQ1 through CQ5) are always or usually rebutting defeaters, meaning that if
they are successful, they destroy the presumption of acceptability of the original argument, shifting the burden to bring forward further argumentation back
to the original argument’s proponent. This strongly motivates the original argument’s proponent to anticipate them. They are also almost always rule-based
arguments grounded in clearly applicable and easily applied authorities. Finding binding authority that interprets a statutory provision, for example, is quite
easy with contemporary online research tools. Often, rebutting defeaters attack
the argument on factual grounds. So, in the examples in Figure 1, the record in
the instant case, which is a narrowly confined fact-world based on rules of procedure and evidence, may provide clear bases for the rebutting defeater.
Some defeaters of the legal deduction, however, are not in the form of ruleor fact-based arguments but instead involve application of legal analogies
(some CQ2 challenges and CQ6) or policy arguments (CQ7). Anticipating and
producing these defeaters is more challenging. The range of possible texts to
support such arguments is much greater, and the effort to anticipate further
counterarguments requires greater interpretive skill. An argument’s proponent
87

As noted above, if a court that adopted an exception in this way is not binding on the instant case, this would be an undercutting, not a rebutting, defeater. The instant case’s judge
would have to decide whether there is good reason to adopt that exception.
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is likely less motivated to search out the potential counterarguments and must
dedicate greater resources to doing so.
I said above that critical questions give rise to defeaters, but as this Section
has emphasized, the main argument’s opponent must support each defeater
with an argument, which can itself be subject to defeaters, or “defeater defeaters.”88 As we are about to see, the legal analogies and arguments from policy
discussed in this Section require more complex responses and greater preparation to anticipate those responses.
2. Legal Analogies Are More Defeasible
Much like legal deductions, legal analogies89 have an argumentation
scheme and corresponding set of critical questions. The argumentation scheme
for legal analogy, like that for legal deduction, has the pattern of major and minor premises leading to a conclusion.
ARGUMENTATION SCHEME: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY90
Major Premise:
Minor Premise:
Conclusion:

Legal category A applied to cited case, and cited case had features
ƒ1 . . . ƒn.
Instant case has features ƒ1 . . . ƒn.
Legal category A applies to instant case.

We might instantiate this argumentation form with another argument about
the hypothetical Springer statute. Assume for the moment that a previous case
in Springer’s court of last resort—State v. Biker—concluded that the defendant
operated a vehicle when they rode a motorcycle in the park; assume also that
Ms. Boostrider is accused of riding a motorized skateboard in the park. At issue
is whether it is a vehicle.

88

Pollock, supra note 9, at 485.
I have referred to the case-based reasoning used when applying the holding in a previously decided case to an instant case as “legal analogy” to distinguish it from true analogy—
legal analogies are usually arguments by example—while at the same time respecting the
language of lawyers, who talk about ‘analogizing’ and ‘disanalogizing’ cases. Larson, supra
note 10, at 673; Larson, supra note 2, at 141.
90 The argumentation scheme I originally presented had different premises. Larson, supra
note 10, at 702. I have reorganized them here to permit the major premise to stand as a legal
principle and to have the minor premise provide assertions only about the instant case (much
like the legal deduction). Further, empirical evidence I have gathered since the earlier paper
shows that argument proponents hardly ever assert the relevance of the similarities they
identify between cited cases and the instant case when they use legal analogy. Larson (in
preparation). The relevance of the (dis)similarities between cases remains only as an undercutting defeater in CQ4 and CQ5.
89

22 NEV. L.J. 739

Spring 2022]

ENDOGENOUS AND DANGEROUS

761

ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY: BIKER & BOOSTRIDER91
Major Premise:

Minor Premise:
Conclusion:

The machine in Biker, which implicated Springer statute section
15.15 and in which the machine had a motor and the machine had
wheels, was a vehicle.
Ms. Boostrider’s conduct implicates Springer statute section
15.15, and her machine has a motor and has wheels.
Ms. Boostrider’s machine is a vehicle.

The set of critical questions for legal analogy begins to expose the argumentation form’s complexity.
CRITICAL QUESTIONS: ARGUMENT BY LEGAL ANALOGY92
CQ1
CQ2

Acceptable Scheme
Question:
Similarity
Question:
CQ2A:

CQ3
CQ4
CQ5

CQ2B:
Precedent Outcome Question:
Relevance
Question:
Relevant
Dissimilarity
Question:

CQ6

Inconsistent Precedent Question:

CQ7

Binding Precedent
Question:
Jurisdictional Difference Question:
Precedent Quality
Question:

CQ7A
CQ7B

Do the circumstances of this argument permit application of legal analogy from a cited case?
With regard to features f1 . . . fn, is every one of them
present in the cited case and the instant case? For
each feature fx:
Has any legal authority defined feature ƒx or narrowed or expanded its definition?
On the record in the case, is feature ƒx present?
Did cited case really assign legal category A?
Are features f1 . . . fn relevant to legal category A?
Are there dissimilarities g1 . . . gn between the cited
case and instant case that are relevant to legal category A? (These may be differences in facts or in the law
that was applied.)
Is there some other case that is also similar to instant
case in that both have features f1 . . . fn, except that
legal category A is not applied in that case?
To what extent is the cited case binding on the court
in the instant case? If it is not:
Is there cause to decide the case differently in this
jurisdiction?
Was the cited case wrongly decided?

Figure 2 shows a series of possible defeater arguments relating to the State
v. Boostrider legal analogy in this Section and arising from the critical questions for the legal-analogy argumentation scheme. Here, questions CQ1
through CQ3 are rebutting defeaters, and they serve principally to confirm the
premises of the original argument. If the answer to any of these questions is
‘no,’ the argument’s opponent may say so, offering some argumentation sup91

Adapted from Larson, supra note 10, at 702 (again simplifying the major premise as explained in supra note 90).
92 These questions are adapted from Larson, supra note 10, at 703 (revised to conform to the
framework discussed here).
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porting that position, and the proponent must start over—the presumption of
acceptability is destroyed. The other five questions are undercutting defeaters,
but each merely opens a door to a new line of complex argumentation: questions CQ4 and CQ5 about the relevance of similarities and dissimilarities between the cited and instant case, CQ6 about the capability of the cited case to
stand in the argumentation scheme if it is inconsistent with other precedents,
CQ7A about whether differences in the jurisdiction from which the cited case
is drawn require a different outcome from the instant case, and CQ7B about
whether the cited case was decided wrongly.
Question CQ7A might require further explanation, as it also illustrates
some fluidity in the categories of undercutting defeaters here. Imagine, for example, that both the instant and cited case involve a dispute about an employment agreement and that the cited case is from Montana, which prohibits employment non-compete agreements.93 If the instant case is in a jurisdiction that
does not have a similar statute, a different outcome in the instant case may well
be justified based on CQ7A. But the argument’s opponent might instead raise
the difference in jurisdiction as a feature of the instant case that is relevantly
different from the cited case under question CQ5.
Each of the arguments that the original argument’s opponent might make
based on questions CQ4 through CQ7 will itself be organized according to
some legal argumentation scheme—a legal analogy or policy argument—and
will invite critical evaluation by the original argument’s proponent. I will not
fully explore argumentation schemes for policy arguments here; rather, I will
only preview that work to emphasize their argumentative complexity.94 A policy argument requires at least two separate but interlinked arguments. The first
is an argument that the legal system does or should have a particular goal; the
second is that taking some particular action will achieve the goal or at least
make it more likely.95 Each of these arguments has its own argumentation
scheme and critical questions.96 The interpretive license required to construct a
policy argument and the possible authorities to support it—including nonbinding legal texts but also non-legal texts such as economics and social science articles and religious texts—make it the type of argument most subject to
criticism and most prone to error if not subjected to such criticism before it is
adopted.97

93

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (West 2021).
See generally Brian N. Larson, Coding Guide & Replication Data for ‘Precedent as Rational Persuasion,’ TEX. DATA REPOSITORY (Oct. 23, 2020), https://doi.org/10.18738/T8
/SXNR02 [https://perma.cc/V4RP-VQDH] [hereinafter Larson, Coding Guide and Data];
see also Larson, supra note 2, at 169. The development of a legal policy argumentation
scheme is in preparation.
95 See Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV. 59, 70–79 (2001).
96 See DOUGLAS WALTON ET AL., ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 199–202 (2008).
97 Margolis, supra note 95, at 79–82.
94
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FIGURE 2: ARGUMENTATION SCHEME AND EXAMPLE DEFEATER ARGUMENTS FOR LEGAL
ANALOGY

Contrast Figure 2 with Figure 1 to see, first, that the critical questions for
legal deductions or rule-based arguments are more commonly rebutting than
undercutting defeaters and, second, that the types of arguments supporting de-
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featers in legal analogies are more likely themselves to be legal analogies and
policy arguments. The range of available responses to undercut an argument by
legal analogy or argument from policy is large. It is much less likely that an argument’s proponent will anticipate them all than with the legal deduction argumentation scheme.
The distinction is not lost on legal writers in general. In the broader study
on which this Article is based, I observed that judges and advocates used these
types of arguments in inverse relation to this hierarchy of complexity: Advocates used rule-based arguments about twice as often as the more-complex legal analogies, and they used legal analogies about twice as often as the stillmore-complex arguments from policy.98 Judges tended to use rule-based arguments slightly more often and legal analogies slightly less often than advocates.99
But why does this matter when judges are writing opinions?
C. Judges Should Avoid Using Endogenous Cases
The moral of our story is simple: we want judges to make the right decision the first time because the hurdles associated with reconsideration and appeal are too high. Based on Section A, it should be clear that there are dueprocess and cognitive bases for wanting the parties to present the best arguments on issues to judges before they make their decisions. Section B showed
that legal arguments are defeasible and subject to critical questions. Judges are
thus more likely to apply precedents correctly—justifying their decisions with
cogent argumentation—when the parties have briefed and zealously argued
over those very precedents. Consequently, judges should generally avoid citing
cases the parties have not briefed. This restraint is especially important where
the judge is using a case as a legal analogy or for a policy argument because it
is much more difficult for the judge to anticipate the counterarguments applicable to those arguments.
As we saw for the legal-deduction and legal-analogy argumentation
schemes above, the critical questions available to the opponent or evaluator of
a presumptively acceptable argument fall into two categories: rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters.100 A rebutting defeater is more likely fact based
or deductive or rule based itself and is easier to formulate and evaluate than an
undercutting defeater. Because failing to anticipate a rebutting defeater will be
fatal to the original argument, the original argument’s proponent is also very
motivated to anticipate it. Undercutting defeaters, on the other hand, are more
likely analogy or policy based and thus harder to anticipate. Because they only
undercut and do not entirely rebut the original argument, the proponent may
also be less motivated to anticipate them.

98

Larson, supra note 2, at 141.
Id.
100 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
99
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This points to an important difference between the arguments of advocates
and judges: when advocates make arguments in their briefs, they know that
their opponents are just one brief away from opposing them. They must necessarily anticipate the arguments the opponents will make.101 They also know (or
hope) the judge will be reading the briefs and interposing their own critical
questions, and advocates must anticipate those counterarguments as well. A
judge writing an opinion also probably wishes to avoid making a poor argument, but the response of a party to the judge’s opinion must overcome higher
hurdles even to be heard, whether the party moves the court for reconsideration
or appeals the decision. If, for example, a party decides to move for reconsideration, the court has considerable discretion whether to hear or grant the motion,
and many cases characterize the remedy as one that is extremely rare and that
should be granted only in very exceptional circumstances.102 If, on the other
hand, the party wishes to appeal the court’s decision, it must first satisfy the requirement that the decision constitute a final judgment.103 It must then bear
costs associated with the appeal and the low probability of success.104 In either
case, the party must bear (and impose on its opponent) the costs of briefing the
motion or appeal. On the motion to reconsider, the party also faces the hurdle
of the judge’s earlier decision. The confirmation bias makes it unlikely the
judge will change a decision after previously reaching it.105
Fine, but to what extent is this a problem? Don’t judges generally cite the
cases that the parties have briefed? When they don’t, isn’t it because the parties’ attorneys have done a poor job of briefing? Part II describes an empirical
study that assessed these questions and presents its findings.

101

An argument’s proponent need not go so far as to offer and rebut the counterargument
along with the original argument; that is often a tactical issue and depends on the probability
that the opponent will discover and articulate the undercutting defeater and whether the original proponent will be able to write a reply brief that, in turn, undercuts the undercutting defeater.
102 See, e.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237,
1238–39 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The decision to alter or amend judgment is committed to the
sound discretion of the district judge and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.”); Flynn v. Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (E.D. La. 2004)
(“A court’s reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy which should be used
only sparingly.”).
103 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts . . . .” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Cimijotti v. Paulsen,
323 F.2d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 1963) (dismissing appeal of district court’s judgment on discovery motions because they did not relate “to the terminating order or judgment in the case”).
104 Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/fees/court-appeals-miscellaneous-fee-schedule [http://perma.cc/23E6-QB2R]
(showing the cost to file an appeal in the Eighth Circuit from the District of Minnesota includes a $500 circuit-court docketing fee); see also Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals,
U.S. COURTS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/12/20/just-facts-us-court
s-appeals [https://perma.cc/F2X2-ZM3Z] (reporting that during the period from 2011–2015,
an average of 4% per year of civil appeals to federal circuit courts resulted in reversals).
105 See supra note 6666 (discussing “bolstering”); see also Mercier & Sperber, supra note
1717, at 63–64.

22 NEV. L.J. 739

766

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

II. UNDERSTANDING ENDOGENEITY
I have argued above that judges should avoid using cases in their reasoning
and opinions that the parties have not briefed.106 I have also claimed that some
endogenous case uses—those supporting policy arguments and legal analogies—are more dangerous than others.107 For that argument to be of consequence, I must show that the use of endogenous cases is widespread. This study
explores the use of endogenous citations in fifty-five randomly selected, published opinions of federal district courts addressing dispositive motions (or
post-trial briefing) turning on fair use in copyright infringement cases.108 Endogenous citations contrast with sticky ones, cases cited in the court’s opinion
that one or more of the parties cited in briefs.109 As Section A shows, previous
studies have found that the use of endogenous citations is widespread, and
those scholars generally regard the practice as unfortunate. The studies of endogeneity have tended, however, to assess merely whether a case cited anywhere in an opinion is cited anywhere in the briefs; this citation-counting approach is rooted in antecedent studies of citation patterns among legal
authorities. Section B describes this study, which looked deeper into the practices of the advocates and judges in it, both in terms of assessing relative endogeneity in courts’ opinions and in terms of assessing endogeneity’s relationship with the courts the judges are citing in their opinions. Section C describes
106

See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.B.
108 The dataset is described in detail elsewhere. Larson, supra note 2, at 159–61; Larson,
Coding Guide and Data, supra note 94. For readers unfamiliar with copyright law or fair
use, this footnote provides a primer. The Constitution grants Congress power to “promote
the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful arts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and
[i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
The Copyright Act of 1976 is the applicable statute. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
Copyright grants to authors of “original works of authorship,” 17 U.S.C. § 102, several exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce the original work in copies, distribute the
work, and make derivative works of it. 17 U.S.C. § 106. “Fair use is a doctrine under copyright law that permits a secondary user of a copyright-protected work to make use of it in a
way that would otherwise be copyright infringement. It is an affirmative defense that defeats
the rights holder’s infringement claim.” Larson, supra note 2, at 159 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 107); Monge v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). In a copyright
case where fair use is at issue, a “secondary user” has allegedly copied part or all of the work
of the rights holder. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir.
1994). Assessing whether a use is a fair use requires a balancing of four factors. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. Courts balance the factors on a case-by-case basis. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). The factors are often broken down into subfactors. For example, analysis of the first factor includes assessment of whether the secondary use is “transformative,” whether it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the [original work] with new expression, meaning, or message,” id. at 579, and also
whether the secondary use is commercial or not for profit, see, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross
Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477–78 (2d Cir. 2004). Some courts consider whether the secondary user
acted in good faith. Id. at 478. The second, third, and fourth factors also have subfactors.
See, e.g., Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2014)
(second factor); NXIVM, 364 F.3d at 480 (third factor); Swatch, 756 F.3d at 90 (fourth factor).
109 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 64.
107
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three of the opinions and their case files in some detail to function as examples
to anchor the discussion that follows. Section D discusses the findings across
the opinions and considers whether there is any relation between endogeneity
and the depth of the parties’ briefing or their resources.
Section E discusses the findings in two further lights. As my argument
above and recommendations below depend on how judges used endogenous
cases—and in fact, because this is the only study to my knowledge that considers that issue, rather than just counting citations anywhere in the briefs and
comparing them to citations anywhere in the opinions—I need to show whether
judges here used endogenous cases for legal analogies and policy arguments. I
also assessed the sources of those authorities to get some sense of how likely it
was that the parties would have found the cases the court cited and perhaps
how likely the court was to anticipate applicable counterarguments. Part III offers recommendations based on these findings.
A. Previous Endogeneity Studies
Endogenous citations by courts are a widespread practice. In a 2020 study,
Professors Bennardo and Chew examined 325 opinions from federal circuit
courts of appeal to assess “citation stickiness.”110 A sticky citation “appears in
one of the parties’ briefs and then again in the court’s opinion.”111 The court’s
citation of an opinion that no party cited in its briefs is “endogenous”—it grew
out of the court itself, rather than the parties.112 Bennardo and Chew found that
51% of the cases those courts cited in their opinions were endogenous.113 Other
studies have found average use of endogenous cites ranged from as little as
25.5% to as much as 65%, depending on the particular judge, the particular
court, or the court’s level.114
Thomas Marvell’s 1978 study of 112 cases from “the supreme court of a
northern industrial state”115 found that more than half the cases the majority
and minority opinions cited were endogenous.116 Marvell extended his study by
looking at thirty cases in the Sixth Circuit, where he found 45% of the cases the
court cited were endogenous.117 Oldfather, Bockhorst, and Dimmer considered
thirty First Circuit opinions, finding that 65% of the court’s citations were endogenous.118 William Manz studied Supreme Court opinions in October Term
1996, finding 26.5% of the opinions the Court’s majorities cited were endoge110

Id. at 64, 84.
Id. at 61, 64.
112 Id. at 62.
113 Id. at 84.
114 See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
115 See THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING
IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 6 (1978).
116 Id. at 132.
117 Id. at 134–35.
118 Chad M. Oldfather et al., Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content
Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1189, 1220, 1238 (2012).
111
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nous.119 And Frank Cross assessed the issue looking only at Chief Justice John
Roberts’s nine majority opinions during his first term on the Supreme Court,
concluding that at least 40.7% of Roberts’s case citations were endogenous.120
Other studies have used other methods.121
High endogeneity should be of concern to practitioners who want to shape
the courts’ analyses with their briefs. Bennardo and Chew surveyed a literature
focused on advocates’ interest in what makes an effective or persuasive
brief:122
In an ideal world, . . . the stickiness percentage of the cases cited in the briefs
would be at or near 100%. Courts would not need to engage in independent legal
research to locate relevant authorities and there would be few or no endogenous
case citations in the opinions.123

Assertions about the significance and causes of endogeneity, however,
place the blame on advocates, on judges and their clerks, on circumstances outside the control of either, or on some combination of these.
Advocates bear the brunt of criticisms: many critics have suggested that
endogeneity results from failure on the part of advocates to do good research or
that attorneys are just not that good at featuring enough relevant citations, focusing too much on irrelevant ones.124 Abramowicz and Colby asserted that
“parties’ briefs are often systematically deficient in providing the court with
information necessary for its lawmaking function—its effort to articulate rules
to govern third parties.”125

119

William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative
Study, 94 L. LIBR. J. 267, 268 ¶ 3, 271 ¶ 8 (2002). Manz, however, considered a citation not
to be endogenous if an amicus curiae cited it. See id. at 268 ¶ 3. For further discussion of the
role of amicus briefs in shaping the Court’s opinions, see generally Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al.,
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 917 (2015).
120 See Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 1251, 1262–63, 1272–74 (2008) (finding that on average, 37% of the citations in
each of the nine opinions Cross studied were endogenous).
121 E.g., Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Our New Judicial Establishment: The Record of the First
Year, 4 RUTGERS L. REV. 353, 361 (1950) (finding—in a study he ordered as Chief Justice—
that in 65% of the New Jersey Supreme Court opinions during a year, there were endogenous cases, averaging 3.5 per opinion).
122 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 76 (citing Shaun B. Spencer & Adam Feldman,
Words Count: The Empirical Relationship Between Brief Writing and Summary Judgment
Success, 22 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 61 (2018); Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946–2013, 86 MISS. L.J. 105 (2017); Adam Feldman,
Counting on Quality: The Effects of Merits Brief Quality on Supreme Court Decisions, 94
DENV. L. REV. 43 (2016)).
123 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 106.
124 Vanderbilt, supra note 121, at 353; Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 107. See generally Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way
Lawyers Write, 8 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 257 (2002) (reporting results of a survey of judges
about their assessment of lawyers’ briefs).
125 Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 3333, at 986 (supporting their claim based on a cite to
a single study, MARVELL, supra note 115115).
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Perhaps judges are at fault, perhaps “deciding cases based on their own
reasoning without the benefit of the parties’ input, perhaps driven by the desire
to rule in a particular party’s favor regardless of whether that party has the better legal argument.”126 This perspective, of course, implicates the discussion of
cognitive biases and due process in Part I.127 Perhaps law clerks and judges use
endogenous cases to “attempt to outdo the parties and impress the world with
garish displays of legal citation.”128 References in this literature to the role of
judges’ clerks are common.129 There may be other reasons, too, that the courts
may be “ignoring relevant cases and lines of argument that were raised by the
parties.”130
Finally, high endogeneity may not be the fault of anyone. Parties and
courts may be situated differently in terms of research resources. This could
favor parties with greater resources and access to the most powerful research
tools. “Perhaps courts and attorneys use different research techniques or platforms and are exposed to different spheres of research results.”131 And “perhaps many cases are simply interchangeable. If ten or twenty cases all state the
same proposition, then the parties and the court may cite to different cases
while discussing the same legal rules or lines of reasoning.”132
This last observation highlights a problem with nearly every study of how
one kind of legal authority uses others: they merely count citations. If a court
opinion cites a case that neither of the parties cited, one time or twenty, for one
purpose or ten, it counts as one endogenous citation.133 I have discussed this
limitation at length elsewhere,134 and Bennardo and Chew and others who have
studied citation practices acknowledge that it would be helpful to see how
courts use the cases they cite, not merely that they cite them.135 This gap in the
literature led me to conduct an empirical study of fifty-five court opinions and
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Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 107.
See supra Section I.A.
128 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 107.
129 See, e.g., Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 3333, at 972; Bennardo & Chew, supra note
2, at 107; Gardner, supra note 1919, at 1631, 1673.
130 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 107.
131 Id. at 108.
132 Id.
133 A very recent exception is Professor Cooney’s assessment of judges’ citation practices
during one year in each of two state appellate courts and in the Supreme Court. Mark
Cooney, What Judges Cite: A Study of Three Appellate Courts, 50 STETSON L. REV. 1
(2020). Cooney studied citation practices during a single year of three different appellate
courts: U.S. Supreme Court (2015 term), Virginia Court of Appeals (2017), and Wisconsin
Court of Appeals (2017). Id. at 1. His study counted a citation as “a reference bearing at least
some formal element of a full or short citation.” Id. at 3. Though it is not entirely clear, this
language suggests that if a case were cited four times in an opinion, it would count as four
citations in the opinion.
134 Larson, supra note 2, at 156–58.
135 See Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 105 n.133; see also John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 384 (1977).
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the advocates’ briefs that precipitated them, looking at how the advocates and
judges used each case they cited in each segment of their arguments.136
B. Materials and Methods for This Study
For a broader study of legal argumentation focused on how judges and advocates use cases in their arguments, I collected fifty-five randomly selected
federal district court opinions addressing dispositive motions (or post-trial
briefing), in cases where the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement and the
disposition of the case depended on the affirmative defense of fair use.137 I also
collected 144 of the advocates’ briefs that precipitated these opinions. Data for
that study and for this one, which grew out of the previous study, are available
at my university’s institutional data repository, including all textual artifacts I
examined.138 Table 1 in the Appendix lists all the opinions studied and the case
numbers I gave them in the previous study and use to refer to them here.139
In the previous study, I segmented the spans of the argumentation relating
to fair use and then assessed the way the argumentation’s author used each case
cited in it. This correspondence between an argumentation segment and a cited
case is the object of study I referred to as a “case use”:
[A] correspondence between one segment of an artifact’s argument and a single
cited case [that] encodes the argumentative purpose(s) of citing that case in support of the argument in that section. An argument segment may cite the case
more than once, but there is only one case use per segment per case cited. 140

An argument segment may use a case for more than one purpose, and the
previous study found three types of case use predominated as rational argumentative appeals in the texts studied there.141 First, and most commonly, authors’
citations “to a prior opinion would support the claim that the rule exists in the
form the author asserted.”142 I coded these case uses as ‘Rule.’143 Typically, authors used such rules as the major premise in a deductive argument.144 Second
in frequency, an author often “describe[ed] a previous case, including facts
about it and its outcome, then argue[d] that the instant case should come out the
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I have reported the principal findings of that study elsewhere. See generally, Larson, supra note 2. See infra Parts II and III for a description of the present study and its findings.
137 I presented the principal findings in Larson, supra note 2. The description of the previous
study that follows here tracks the one I provided in the applicable article, id. at 158–170 and
in the data repository and coding guide associated with it, Larson, Coding Guide and Data,
supra note 9490.
138 Larson, Coding Guide and Data, supra note 9494.
139 Full Bluebook- or ALWD Guide-style citations to these documents here would be cumbersome, and as I am referring to them as objects of research and not as authorities to support any claim about the law, I think the practice is justified.
140 Larson, supra note 2, at 165.
141 See Larson, Coding Guide and Data, supra note 9490, for examples.
142 Larson, supra note 2, at 166, 191.
143 Id. at 169.
144 See id.
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same (opposite) way because the cases were (dis)similar.”145 Conventionally,
the use of a case as an example in this way is what lawyers refer to as “analogizing” or “disanalogizing” a case.146 There is some debate about whether these
examples or “legal analogies” can stand on their own or must be accompanied
by a universal rule.147 Regardless of the outcome of that debate, it is true that
examples were used to illustrate previous applications of a rule and argue the
instant case should come out the same way.148 I coded these case uses as “Example.”149 Third in frequency were case uses where the author cited “a prior
opinion to assert that a policy goal or consideration supports a particular outcome.”150 Such a use of a case might function to explain the why of a rule, the
what of which the author just stated or was just about to state.151 These case uses were coded as “Policy.”152
In the earlier study, I broke the 199 textual artifacts into 1,810 argument
segments, identifying and classifying a total of 5,638 case uses.153 In addition
to the 1,437 case uses in the fifty-five opinions, I also analyzed each principal
brief raising the fair-use defense and the first response by its opponent(s), 144
artifacts making 4,201 case uses.154 In many cases, however, there were further
briefs (replies and sur-replies) that I did not collect for the previous study.155
For this study, I went back to the dockets for these fifty-five opinions and identified the additional briefs that may have addressed the fair-use questions that
the opinions took up. I then identified the cases cited there.156 I recorded other
information about each case cited in the briefs and opinions, including its citation and court of origin.
The resulting dataset allowed me to determine whether a court’s opinion
cited a case that any of the briefs had cited and how the court used that case in
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Id. at 166, 191.
Larson, supra note 10, at 673.
147 See id. at 665 and references cited there; see also supra note 81.
148 Larson, supra note 2, at 169–70.
149 Id. at 170.
150 Id. at 166, 191.
151 I also found a fourth category of rational appeal, “assert[ing] that courts in previous cases have generally taken a particular approach.” Id. at 166. In that paper, I also discussed a
variety of other, less-common uses to which judges and advocates put cases in their arguments. Id. at 181–89.
152 Larson, supra note 2, at 169.
153 Id. at 141, 165.
154 Id. at 161; Larson, Coding Guide and Data, supra note 94.
155 See Larson, supra note 2, at 161.
156 It is possible that the parties referred to cases not in their briefs during oral arguments
before the judges. Previous studies have suggested this is not a concern. Bennardo & Chew,
supra note 2, at 70 n.26, 106 n.134. That question is one that would benefit from further
study. Of course, if my recommendations below are followed, this limitation would be of
greater concern, because there might more likely be cases discussed at oral argument not
raised in the briefs.
146
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its argument.157 I present the findings of my quantitative analysis of these data
in Sections D and E.
Because some previous explanations of endogenous citations suggested
that inadequate briefing by advocates was at issue, for this study I attempted a
quantitative assessment of the depth of treatment of fair use in the briefs: I recorded the average number of case uses in the principal briefs leading to the
opinion and the maximum number of case uses among those briefs. I assessed
the comparative depth of treatment by subtracting the number of case uses in
the opinion from the average number of case uses in the principal briefs.158
Because one of the possible explanations of endogenous citations above
suggests that the parties may brief more or less comprehensively based on the
resources available to them, I performed a crude assessment of party resources
by assigning a value to each principal brief based on the size(s) of the law
firm(s) that signed the opinions. I assigned a resource value of 0.5 to individual
pro se litigants, 1 to law firms with one to ten lawyers, 2 to firms of eleven to
fifty lawyers and to corporate attorneys representing their employers, 3 to firms
of fifty-one to two hundred lawyers and to attorneys representing state and federal governments, and 4 to firms with more than two hundred lawyers.159 The
data include the average of the resources used by plaintiffs and defendants and
the maximum resource value from among the firms on both sides. The former
functions as a measure of the legal resources the parties brought collectively to
the case; the latter as a measure of the resources the most-resourced party
brought to the case.160
Parties with fewer resources might also not have the tools or time to find
non-binding cases that would have persuasive effect. To consider this, I examined case uses across all these opinions to explore which types of court the
157

This Article makes no claims about how advocates used the cases in their briefs, in part
because the original study did not include some of the (sur)reply briefs included here, and
thus we did not classify the case uses in the newly collected briefs.
158 An example of how I assessed this may be helpful for the reader. In case 16.01, described in some detail in Section II.C., infra, two parties filed briefs addressing fair use. The
secondary-user defendant’s motion for summary judgment (our artifact 16.01.098) made 3
case uses, and the rights-holder plaintiff’s opposition (our artifact 16.01.109) made 6. I did
not count case uses in their reply briefs. The maximum depth of treatment was thus 6 case
uses and the average was 4.5. The court’s opinion made 24 case uses, and the comparative
depth of treatment was therefore –19.5 (the average depth of the parties’ briefs less the depth
of treatment in the opinion).
159 I examined law-firm websites as of spring 2019 to determine their size.
160 An example of how I calculated this may be helpful for the reader. In case 15.02, described in some detail infra in Section II.C., both parties filed briefs addressing fair use. On
the secondary-user plaintiff’s motion (our artifact 15.02.35) were the law firms Davis Wright
Tremaine, a firm with more than 200 lawyers and therefore a resource score of 4.0; and
Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz PC, a firm with 51–200 lawyers and therefore a resource
score of 3.0. The artifact therefore had a resource score of 3.5 (average of 4.0 and 3.0). On
the rights-holder defendant’s opposition (our artifact 15.02.53) was Kenyon & Kenyon LLP,
a firm with 51–200 lawyers and therefore a resource score of 3.0. That was also the artifact’s
resource score. The maximum party resource score was thus 3.5 (the higher brief) and the
average was 3.3 (average of the two briefs).
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opinions cited: Supreme Court, the binding circuit court, another circuit court, a
trial opinion from the opinion judge’s own federal district, or a trial court from
another federal district. These findings were especially interesting when I considered Rule, Example (legal analogy), and Policy case uses individually.
A deeper, qualitative look at the opinions here and their case files is desirable to acquire a fuller understanding of how the courts presented their arguments and how those arguments related to the arguments that advocates had
presented in their briefs. That study is in preparation.
For the broader research project, I explained my choice of trial-court arguments by noting “that there is far more legal reasoning and argumentation at
the trial-court level simply because there are more cases adjudicated there, and
each case may require many stopping points . . . where the parties and the judges consider legal arguments.”161 I also justified a focus on arguments relating to
copyright fair use.162 Here I am not trying to generalize from the present data
set to all court opinions or even to all fair-use opinions. Rather, I am attempting
to characterize how these courts used endogenous citations and how the parties
and appellate courts reacted to them. Of course, it would be wonderful to extend the characterizations here to other legal domains, but that will require future study. Absent arguments or evidence to the contrary, however, it would be
reasonable to assume that at least other federal advocates and trial-court judges
would probably react similarly, even in other types of case.
Sections D and E present the findings, but Section C first briefly describes
three of the cases in more detail to provide qualitative context to the quantitative findings that follow.
C. Examples of the Cases Studied
It may help readers to appreciate the statistics below if they have a brief
description of three of the case files, one on each end of the endogeneity continuum and one in the middle:163 Case uses in the 16.01 opinion were 79% endogenous, near the high end; in 12.02, there were no endogenous case uses; and
in 15.02, 29% of case uses were endogenous, the same as the mean for all the
opinions.
Study case 16.01 was Ranieri v. Adirondack Development Group, LLC,
where Chief Judge Suddaby resolved cross motions for summary judgment between the plaintiff, unlicensed architect Dominick Ranieri, and more than a
half dozen defendants, each of whom Ranieri accused of infringing his copyright-protected architectural design.164 The plaintiff and several defendants
161

Larson, supra note 2, at 160.
Id. at 159 (noting that variations in argumentation style across legal domains “might
function as noise in analyzing any particular practice across them”).
163 Because I describe these cases in more depth, readers may want to see these opinions for
themselves. Therefore, unlike the other references to cases in this study, I provide the full
citations to the opinions here upon my initial mention of them, but I’ve omitted internal pinpoint citations.
164 Ranieri v. Adirondack Dev. Grp., 164 F. Supp. 3d 305, 318 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).
162
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moved for summary judgment on a variety of grounds. Local rules required
that memoranda of law on motions must not exceed twenty-five pages.165 The
real estate broker that raised fair use also claimed it was entitled to summary
judgment on seven other grounds; in a brief of more than 9,100 words, it addressed fair use in only 370 of them.166 The broker’s briefs were signed by a
law firm with more than 200 lawyers.167 Ranieri—represented by a firm we estimated at between eleven and fifty attorneys—responded to the broker’s motion in a single opposition.168 Despite the need to cover so much ground, plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the broker’s motion was—well—brief, only 4,400
words, with its discussion of fair use limited to 520 words or so.169 Neither side
engaged in much analysis, and the defendant relied almost exclusively on a
single trial-court case from another circuit to support its argument.170
The moving party, the real estate broker, had offered a scattershot motion
for summary judgment on a wide variety of grounds and failed to fully brief
fair use. Practically speaking, this situation forced the judge to brief the fair-use
arguments soup to nuts. The discussion of fair use in Chief Judge Suddaby’s
opinion included twenty-three case uses, nineteen (83%) of them endogenous.
He gave nearly 1,500 words of his 5,100-word-long opinion to fair use. Among
his endogenous case uses were three Examples: two trial-court cases in other
circuits and one binding circuit case, which was also used for a Rule. These
were the only Examples the judge used. Of the sixteen other endogenous case
uses, thirteen were coded as Rules, of which seven were coded also as Policy;
two were coded only as Policy; and one was cited only to support a quotation.
The judge denied the motion, a decision that was not immediately appealable,
and the parties later settled.171
Study case 12.02 was National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang.172 There,
secondary user Rang was a reporter for a sports blog who reported a small
number of player-profile scores prepared by the rights-holder, National Football Scouting, as part of its proprietary service to NFL teams to help them assess college players.173 NFS sued, alleging copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets, and the parties later cross-moved for summary
judgment.174 Rang spent more than 3,400 words analyzing fair use in an 8,200165

See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(1).
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant C.B. Prime Properties’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 19–20, Ranieri, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305 (No. 11-cv-1013), 2014 WL
12656298, at *17 [hereinafter Ranieri Brief for Defendant].
167
See id.
168 See generally Attorney Affidavit in Opposition, Ranieri, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305 (No. 11cv-1013), ECF No. 109.
169 See Memorandum of Law in Opposition at 9–10, Ranieri, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305 (No. 11CV-1013), ECF No. 109-10.
170 Id.; Ranieri Brief for Defendant, supra note 166, at 19–20.
171 See Stipulation of Discontinuance, Ranieri, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305 (No. 11-CV-1013).
172 Nat’l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
173 Id. at 988.
174 Id.
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word brief in support of summary judgment, reiterating and reinforcing many
of those same arguments in 3,600 words of his opposition to NFS’s crossmotion for summary judgment.175 He was represented by a firm of between fifty and 200 lawyers.176 NFS, the plaintiff, did not mention the affirmative defense of fair use in its motion for summary judgment but treated it in 3,860
words of its 8,800-word brief opposing Rang’s motion.177 It was represented by
two firms, each of which appeared to have fewer than eleven attorneys.178 The
parties made an average of 27.3 case uses in their briefs.179
Judge Ronald B. Leighton found for Rang on fair-use grounds and dismissed the copyright claims.180 He appears to have been fully satisfied with the
parties’ briefing, citing no endogenous cases. In fact, of the seventeen case uses
he made, all but four were super sticky—cases that both parties had cited.181 Of
those four cases that were merely sticky, because only one party cited them, the
secondary user and prevailing party cited three of them. All but one of the cases this court cited were binding, coming from the Ninth Circuit and Supreme
Court. Though Judge Leighton used more than 2,800 words of his 5,571-word
opinion to discuss fair use, he needed only seventeen case uses to dispose of
the fair-use analysis; the parties’ briefs made deeper use of cases for it.
Study case 15.02 was Adjmi v. DLT Entertainment Ltd.182 There, a playwright brought an action against the producer of the television series Three’s
Company, seeking a declaration that his play—which he alleged was a parody
of the series—did not infringe the rights holder’s copyright in the television series.183 The defendant rights holder countersued, alleging infringement.184 The
secondary user supported his motion to dismiss on fair-use grounds with a brief
totaling nearly 8,900 words, of which more than 6,300 words focused on the
fair-use analysis.185 On the brief were two law firms; one having more than 200
lawyers and the other between fifty-one and 200 lawyers.186 The rights holder
opposed that motion with its own memorandum of more than 10,000 words,
175

See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (No. 11-cv05762) [hereinafter Motion for Rang]; Defendant’s Reply in Support of Summary Judgment
and Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6–
15, Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (No. 11-cv-05762).
176 Motion for Rang, supra note 175.
177 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (No. 11-cv-05762).
178 See id.
179 See, e.g., Motion for Rang, supra note 175.
180 Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 995. The case remained alive with the trade secrets claim, but
the parties settled in January 2013. See Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction, Rang, 912
F. Supp. 2d 985 (No. 11-cv-05762).
181 See Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 84.
182 Adjmi v. DLT Ent. Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
183 Id. at 515, 528.
184 Id. at 515.
185 See Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Adjmi, 97 F. Supp. 3d 512 (No. 14 Civ. 0568).
186 Id.
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just over 5,100 of which addressed fair use.187 Its lawyers were from a firm of
between fifty-one and 200 lawyers.188
Chief Judge Loretta Preska tackled the motion in an opinion of more than
12,500 words, of which just short of 5,000 words addressed the fair-use analysis. She granted the secondary user’s motion, concluding the play made fair use
of the TV series and declaring that it was not an infringement.189 The fair-use
portions of the parties’ briefs exhibited a 49.5 mean depth of treatment (measured in case uses), and this exceeded the opinion by more than fifteen. Judge
Preska nevertheless chose to cite endogenous cases for ten (29%) of the thirtyfour case uses in her opinion. Interestingly, of these ten endogenous case uses,
six were citations to opinions by Supreme Court justices emphasizing core
copyright policy considerations. The others were to a circuit case and another
case from the same district with which the parties were no doubt familiar.
In this context, the statistics across all the opinions will be easier to understand.
D. Opinions Exhibited Significant Endogeneity
Table 2 in the Appendix lists the opinions by case number in order of decreasing endogeneity. It reports the total number of case uses in the coded segment of each opinion, the number of endogenous case uses, and the gross endogeneity, a ratio of endogenous case uses to all case uses in the opinion. It
also reports the same ratios for case uses that were coded as Rule, Example, and
Policy in this study.
The mean gross endogeneity of case uses in the opinions in this study was
29% (M = .291, SD = .222, Mdn = .250). The method of calculating this number differs from the method used in the studies cited above. Bennardo and
Chew’s study of citation endogeneity is the most recent in the literature, and it
is also the largest at the federal-court level, focused on 325 appellate court
opinions, where 51% of the cases cited were endogenous.190 The gross endogeneity here, if measured according to their methods, is 37.9% (M = .379,
SD = .226, Mdn = .333), still considerably lower than their figure.191 The difference between their figure and mine could stem from a variety of reasons, but
all would require further quantitative or qualitative study to confirm. First, circuit courts, as policy-making courts of appeal, might be more inclined to look
outside the parties’ briefs to inform their decisions. Second, as Bennardo and
Chew noted, the briefing practices there might also confine parties in the extent
to which they can give depth to topics before the court in their briefing. 192
187

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Adjmi, 97 F. Supp. 3d 512 (No. 14 Civ. 0568).
188 Id.
189 Adjmi, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 535.
190 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 84.
191 There, researchers counted cases the opinions and briefs cited anywhere, one time or
100. See Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 84.
192 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 78.
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Third, Bennardo and Chew did not share the focus of this study on copyright
fair use. It may be that circuit courts are less endogenous when discussing such
cases, suggesting they are more endogenous, on average, when discussing at
least one other substantive area of law. In fact, Bennardo and Chew found that
opinions in cases Westlaw classified as “patent” cases exhibited 42% endogeneity, much closer to the figure in this study.193 Of course, patent law is quite
different than copyright law, but they share some common roots in the U.S.
Constitution, and the practitioners—sometimes referring to themselves as ‘intellectual property lawyers’—do sometimes seem to overlap. Fourth, it may be
that my smaller sample size did not have sufficient power or that outliers in the
data unduly affected it. Only further study can determine whether that is true.
Whether we use the mean based on this study’s methods or the one calculated according to the method in earlier studies, the average places this study at
the lower end of those cited above. With one exception, the studies cited above
exhibited gross endogeneity between 45% and 65%. Bennardo and Chew’s
study covered all federal appellate topic areas, whereas mine covered only federal trial courts and their analysis of fair use. Taken together, though, these two
studies suggest that endogeneity of federal court opinions is typically in the 30–
50% range. The practice of using endogenous decisions is widespread.
As the three examples in Section C suggest, there was wide variation
among the opinions in terms of their gross endogeneity. Five of these opinions
used no endogenous citations whatsoever. Four of them exhibited case uses that
were more than 75% endogenous.194
The ratio of endogenous cases was similar for the individual case-use
types. Thus, 29% of the case uses coded as Rule in this sample were endogenous (M = 0.290, SD = .240, Mdn = .250); 28% of those coded as Example
(M = .282, SD = .309, Mdn = .250); and 22% of those coded as Policy
(M = .224, SD = .307, Mdn = .077). The difference in these averages was statistically insignificant (p > 0.05).195 This means that judges used endogenous
cases about as often for each type of case use, whether to support the statement
of a rule, application of an example or legal analogy, or assertion of a policy
justification. As we shall see in Section E, however, there are meaningful dif-

193

Id. at 111.
The variation exhibited here is similar to that exposed in Bennardo and Chew, where two
cases out of 325 had endogeneity greater than 90% and nine had no endogenous cases at all.
Id. at 85. At 100% endogenous, case 14.06 here is an outlier. There, in an opinion some
5,100 words long, the judge’s fair-use analysis made up nearly 1,500 words, despite the fact
that only one brief (the defendant’s opposition to summary judgment) discussed fair use, and
it did so without citing a single case or even the fair-use provision in the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 107. Calibrated Success, Inc. v. Charters, 72 F. Supp. 3d 763, 770–73 (E.D. Mich.
2014).
195 The lack of significant difference between the means of endogenous uses generally and
those coded Example and Policy could probably be attributed to low power in this study. In
any event, the practical difference among these means, ranging between 22% and 29% endogenous, is enough to make the point that judges make these specific types of case use
about as often as they use endogenous cases generally.
194
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ferences in judges’ uses of cases based on their courts of origin and the caseuse type.
The examples above tee up the assessment of whether there was any correlation in the sample at large between the depth of treatment the parties gave to
copyright and judges’ uses of endogenous cases—case 16.01 suggesting it
might be important, but cases 12.02 and 15.02 sending mixed signals. They also raise questions about whether the size of the firms involved correlated to endogenous citations.
Table 3 in the Appendix provides the brief-depth scores and party-resource
scores I assigned to the cases. The brief-depth scores represent the maximum
and mean depth with which the parties’ principal briefs treated fair use, measured in case uses. The comparative brief depth is the mean depth of the parties’
treatment less the depth of the judge’s analysis, expressed in case uses; a negative number there means that the judge used cases more frequently than the
parties did on average. My analysis showed that there was a moderate negative
correlation196 between the depth of treatment of fair use in the briefs and the
proportion of endogenous citations, whether depth of treatment was measured
based on the longest treatment in any of the briefs (rS = –0.434, 95% CI (–
0.627, –0.190), p < .01), the average length of treatment in the briefs (rS = –
0.410, 95% CI (–0.611, –0.160), p < .01), or the comparative treatment (subtracting the case uses in the opinion from the average of case uses in the principal briefs; rS = –0.417, 95% CI (–0.616, –0.168), p < .01).197 In short, deeper
treatment of fair use in the principal briefs correlated moderately with fewer
endogenous citations in the opinion.
Up to a point, it should be obvious that more thorough briefing will result
in less need for judges to find cases on their own. Indeed, the three most endogenous opinions resulted from briefs where the maximum number of case
uses by any party was between zero and six. Nevertheless, many opinions in
the upper half of the endogeneity range were quite thoroughly briefed, and
some in the lower half were comparatively lightly briefed. Depth of treatment
alone cannot account for the variation.
I also attempted to assess apparent access of the parties to legal resources,
measured based on a score derived from law-firm size. The party-resource
scores appearing in the table represent the parties’ legal resources, as measured
by the size of the law firms or legal departments that signed their briefs; the
max value represents the most-resourced party, and the average represents the
196

I used the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rS) to assess correlation because of its
robustness to outliers and for other reasons set out in the literature. Joost C.F. de Winter et
al., Comparing the Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients Across Distributions
and Sample Sizes: A Tutorial Using Simulations and Empirical Data, 21 PSYCH. METHODS
273, 284–86 (2016). I also reviewed scatterplots to discover whether any non-linear relationships might exist between these variables.
197 I use the conventional tiers from Schober and his colleagues, who characterized 0.00–
0.10 as “negligible,” 0.10–0.39 as “weak,” 0.40–0.69 as “moderate,” 0.70–0.89 as “strong,”
and 0.90–1.00 as “very strong.” Patrick Schober et al., Correlation Coefficients: Appropriate
Use and Interpretation, 126 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1763, 1765 (2018).
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average resource score of the parties. The average resource score of the parties’
principal briefs was not significantly correlated with endogeneity. The maximum resource score weakly correlated negatively with gross endogeneity (rs =
–0.272, 95% CI (–0.501, –0.007), p < .05).198 In short, one of the parties having
a high degree of legal resources in the form of larger firms correlated weakly
with fewer endogenous citations in the opinion: enough to be interesting, but
not enough to explain the variation seen here.
It seems likely, then, that some sources of the variation will be found in the
judges’ chambers. As it happens, there was variation within some judges’ opinions. My sample was random, but it happened that there were two judges represented in this study with four opinions each: Dolly M. Gee, from the Central
District of California, and Alvin Hellerstein, from the Southern District of New
York; and three with two each, all from the Southern District of New York:
Jesse M. Furman, Jed S. Rakoff, and Gregory H. Woods. The concentration of
cases in my study in the district courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits is certainly a result of my sample choice. New York and California districts made up
more than half of my data set because those districts are more likely to be home
to copyright lawsuits, owing to the concentration of publishing, entertainment,
and technology in those regions. These judges showed both consistency and
interesting variation in endogeneity, but without deeper qualitative or quantitative study, it is difficult to speculate on the causes.199 One possibility is that
judges’ endogeneity might fluctuate depending on their clerks’ dispositions. A
look at a single judge’s opinions over a period of years might reveal insights
there, but the research might need to be concerned about maturation effects on
the part of the judge. That requires further study.
In addition to looking at endogeneity in opinions, it is valuable to consider
how courts used endogenous cases based on the originating courts of the opinions cited and also based on case-use types. An analysis that looked at all 1,437
case uses in the opinions in this study was better suited to explore these issues
than looking at their relative frequency within individual opinions. Section E
takes up these findings.
E. Sources and Uses of Endogenous Cases Varied Widely
As we saw above, courts used endogenous citations in their opinions at
about the same frequency, whether we are speaking of overall or gross endogeneity or the endogeneity of cases used to support rules, give examples of appli198

There is a modest degree of multicollinearity here, as the maximum resource score
among the briefs was moderately correlated with maximum depth of treatment and average
depth of treatment. It may be that larger firms are slightly more likely to find and cite more
cases, making it less likely that the court will cite endogenous cases.
199 Both of Judge Furman’s opinions, cases 16.05 and 17.04, were 25% endogenous. Judge
Gee’s showed moderate range around the average level: case 12.07, 7%; 13.02, 7%; 13.03,
26%; and 15.09, 50%. Judge Hellerstein exhibited low endogeneity, 7%, for three opinions,
cases 12.04, 15.07, and 17.02, but increased to 58% in the fourth, case 14.04. Judge Rakoff’s
cases were in the middle and low range—case 14.02, 24% and 17.01, 7%—while Judge
Woods’ were in the middle and high range: 18.03, 77% and 18.05, 39%.
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cations of rules (legal analogies), or to make policy arguments. But when the
court looks outside the briefs for opinions to cite, it may be that the court looks
in different places for different types of support. It may also be that courts have
greater resources—in terms of time and research tools—to locate such opinions, even if they come from other circuits or trial courts, authority that is not
binding but can nevertheless support the court’s decision.
To explore this question, I grouped all 1,427 case uses in the opinions in
this study, classifying them based on whether the author of the cited case was
the Supreme Court or the circuit in which our judge was writing (which I called
the ‘binding circuit’) or if it was one of the several kinds of non-binding cases—an opinion from another circuit, an opinion from the same district court as
the opinion we studied (‘same trial’), or a district-court case from elsewhere
(‘other trial’). By looking at judges’ preferences for citing cases from these
types of courts, particularly as they consider whether to cite endogenous cases,
we can see in the figures that follow that judges’ treatment of different types of
case use varied in important ways.
Table 4 in the Appendix provides the numerical findings, and Figure 3 here
shows the courts of origin for all 1,437 case uses in the opinions in this study
and the extent to which they were endogenous. It is immediately apparent that
cases used in these opinions tended to come from binding courts—the same
circuit or the Supreme Court—making up 71% of all case uses. In all, 72% of
the 1,437 uses in the opinions were sticky, the other 28% endogenous.200

200

Above, I reported that average gross endogeneity in the opinions was 29%. The difference results from calculating across all case uses here and calculating average endogeneity
per opinion there.
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FIGURE 3: ALL OPINION CASE USES (N=1,437) SHOWING CITED-CASE COURT OF ORIGIN
AND ENDOGENEITY

We can say that judges cited to endogenous cases about as often for policy
and legal-analogy arguments as they did for rule-based arguments and case uses in general.201 Among the case uses, 28% of Rule case uses were endogenous,
26% for Example, and 27% for Policy. As Figure 4 shows, the picture is slightly more complicated if we look at case uses based on whether they were coded
Rule, Example, or Policy. Each category receives its own panel in Figure 4.
Note first that the subtotals to the panels add to more than the total of 1,437
case uses in this study because a single case use can be coded for more than
one purpose.202
Focusing on Figure 4.A (based on data in Table 5 in the Appendix), we can
see a pattern for Rule case uses that looks very much like that for case uses in
general: for Rules, the Supreme Court and binding circuit provided 78% of the
case uses. Endogenous case uses made up 28% of all Rule case uses. This percentage is the same for case uses of all kinds (Figure 3), and the priority of the
various source/endogeneity combinations is only slightly different here from
case uses in general, and only in the infrequent categories. In brief, Figure 4.A
looks a great deal like Figure 3.
As I noted in the previous report of that part of this study, those writing legal arguments prefer Rule case uses, using them about twice as often as Examples and four times as often as Policy. Judges have a slightly greater preference
for Rules, and we can see the total of Examples here is only 36%—a little over
a third—of the total for Rules. Judges may prefer rule-based reasoning for the
very reasons discussed in Part I: rule-based arguments are easier to construct,
and it is easier to anticipate counterarguments.
201

This is consistent, too, with the finding above looking at mean relative endogeneity within opinions. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 4: OPINION CASE USES SEGMENTED BY CASE-USE TYPE AND SHOWING CITEDCASE COURT OF ORIGIN AND ENDOGENEITY (N = 1,437)

Though I would expect that courts in general would prefer citing to the Supreme Court or the binding circuit, the tendency for the latter in these data
could have something do to with the subject matter. As I noted above, more
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than half the artifacts in this study came from district courts in the Second and
Ninth Circuits. The relative frequency with which those circuits are home to
copyright cases means that those courts will see and generate more copyright
precedent. In fact, among the fifty most-used cases in these opinions, all but
eight were Supreme Court opinions and cases from courts in the Second and
Ninth Circuits. Of the 170 cases cited in non-binding case uses in opinions
from courts in all circuits, 112 of them were from courts in the Second and
Ninth Circuits. With many of the opinions in this study coming from courts in
the Second and Ninth Circuits and many persuasive precedents coming from
those same circuits, it is possible that the propensity for case uses to cite a case
from a binding circuit may be higher here than with other legal domains.
One troubling bit here is the number of instances of citations to trial courts,
which by definition are not binding, for Rules. Though they make up less than
20% of this case-use type, 56% of them are endogenous. It is hard enough to
see the value of a trial court citing a trial court for a legal rule, but to do so with
an endogenous case seems particularly strained.203 Professor Gardner has provided examples of district courts rulifying “analogical heuristics,” resulting in
the outcomes of distinctly fact-based precedents becoming rules for later precedents that do not attend to the same facts.204 The danger is that a trial court,
not faced with the consequences of its decision becoming binding precedent,
may not attend as carefully to the precedential effect of its rule statements. Allowing the parties to argue the applicability of such a rule might help to remedy
this problem.
As Figure 4.B shows (based on data in Table 6 in the Appendix), the picture is quite different when we look at case uses coded as Example. Here, two
things are immediately apparent. First, only 47% of the Example case uses had
binding courts as their sources (compared to 78% of the Rules). Like all case
uses, Example case uses most prominently cited the home circuit. But prominent here were non-binding circuits in second place at 22% and trial courts
making up 30% of case-use sources. Thus, uses of non-binding cases made up
53% of Example case uses and only 22% of Rule case uses. Overall, 26% of
Example case uses were endogenous. But as the use of non-binding cases in the
opinions creeps up, so, too, does the incidence of endogenous cases among
them, with half the case uses citing other trial courts being endogenous and almost half of the uses citing non-binding circuits. The percentage of endogenous
case uses among citations to the same trial court is lower, however.
These findings make some sense. First, it is likely that both advocates and
judges look farther afield for examples because the hallmark of a legal analogy
is that the instant and cited case have factual similarities. Given there is a much
larger number of trial-court opinions and non-binding circuit opinions than
there is of Supreme Court and binding-circuit opinions, the chances of finding
203

One reviewer commented that if the cited trial court synthesized a rule that had previously not been synthesized from binding authority, which the court in the instant case would
have had to use anyway, it may not be a strained connection.
204 Gardner, supra note 19, at 1659–62.
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a factually similar case in that bigger pool are much higher.205 Unfortunately,
though, the chances of not finding any particular case are also higher. Thus,
when the court finds a non-binding case to use as an example, if the parties
have not cited it, the court has no way of knowing whether both parties found
the case and excluded it because of some relevant dissimilarity the court is
overlooking, or whether some quirk of the research tools or techniques of the
court generated a different result than the parties. The latter issue is not hypothetical: in an empirical study of six major legal-research platforms, Professor
Susan Nevelow Mart found that there was “hardly any overlap in the cases that
appear in the top ten results returned by each database. An average of forty
percent of the cases were unique to one database, and only about seven percent
of the cases were returned in search results in all six databases.”206
Interestingly, however, a recent study suggests that access to online research tools has not resulted in higher endogeneity: it showed that appellate
opinions in 1957 exhibited higher endogeneity than those in 2017.207 In either
case, however, the court should give the parties a chance to weigh in on the applicability of the cited case.
Finally, Figure 4.C shows (based on data in Table 7 in the Appendix) the
source court/endogeneity combinations for Policy case uses. There, citations to
binding courts made up 86% of all case uses, a pronounced increase from all
other categories. Among these case uses, 27% were endogenous. The nonbinding sources, however, invert a pattern visible in nearly all the other examples: of the thirty-eight case uses that cite non-binding cases, considerably
more than half of them—twenty-five—are endogenous.
Here, again, the patterns make some sense. As noted in Part I, policy arguments are theoretically the most complex to construct because their counterarguments are potentially the most numerous and complex. If a court cites a
case for policy at all, it can head off some of those counterarguments simply by
choosing a binding authority. But as with Examples, high endogeneity appears
here among the non-binding sources. In fact, of Policy case uses citing nonbinding sources, a whopping 66% of them are endogenous.
The findings from this Section are the focus of the recommendations in
Part III.

205

The “pressure stems from the frequent absence of binding authority on issues that district
courts must decide” or the “vertical vacuum.” Id. at 1629. Gardner notes the kinds of cases
that might require citing to district courts: procedural questions, which are “structurally
shielded from appellate review”; “selection effects in what issues are presented to appellate
courts”; “issues are novel” on which there is not yet binding precedent. Id. at 1629–30.
206 Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implications for Legal
[Re]Search, 109 L. LIBR. J. 387, 390 (2017).
207 Aaron S. Kirschenfeld & Alexa Z. Chew, Citation Stickiness, Computer-Assisted Legal
Research, and the Universe of Thinkable Thoughts (June 6, 2021) (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3860978 [https://perma.cc/L8MH-GQKP].
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III. A SOLUTION: REHABILITATING ENDOGENOUS CASES
This Part explores solutions to the concerns I have raised in this Article. In
Part I, I explained why judges should have special concerns about using endogenous cases to support legal analogies and arguments from policy. Part II described this study and showed that judges in it used endogenous cases frequently in their reasoning and opinions, just as frequently with the most dangerous
categories—legal analogies and arguments about policy—as they used them in
general. Here in Section A, I propose that judges should view endogenous cases according to a ‘hierarchy of endogenous badness,’ identifying those cases
that judges should be least willing to use as endogenous ones. Section B explains how judges can remedy the risks associated with the most dangerous endogenous case uses, by rehabilitating the endogenous cases as ones that the
parties have a chance to brief or argue over. Section C considers further research that could address this study’s limitations and extend it.
A. The Hierarchy of Endogenous Badness
Given the complexity of anticipating counterarguments and the difficulty
of finding the proverbial needle among the haystack of potentially applicable
non-binding authorities, I propose that there is a hierarchy of endogenous case
uses, at the top of which are those that courts should probably never use and at
the bottom of which are those the courts can probably continue using without
major concern. In general, because of the complexity of anticipating counterarguments for case uses in the Policy and Example categories, these are the ones
the judges should most avoid as endogenous case uses. Table 8 in the Appendix
shows these situations in what I believe to be the order of decreasing concern,
along with the number of instances of such uses among the 1,437 case uses in
this study.
Three types of endogenous case use live at the top of the hierarchy of badness. Citing endogenous non-binding cases for policy arguments (twenty-five
instances) puts judges on limbs about as far out as they can be. Given the mass
of possible authorities for policy arguments, the parties should have notice of
those the court plans to use. The same is true for examples or legal analogies
from trial-court cases (forty-five instances); given the many complex ways in
which cases can be relevantly similar and dissimilar to each other, the parties
should have a chance to respond to the court’s intended use of an example from
a trial court.208 But even policy arguments grounded in binding courts (fortynine instances) present risks, as there is often an opposing policy consideration

208

Professor Gardner provides the example of James v. City of Detroit, 430 F. Supp. 3d 285
(E.D. Mich. 2019), arguing that this case generalized a very fact-specific analysis from an
earlier district-court case into a rule disassociated from that context and reached an incorrect
decision. Gardner, supra note 19, at 1659–60.
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that could be interposed to balance the one in any given situation.209 If the parties have not briefed those arguments, the court should be reluctant to use them.
One commentator suggested that endogenous case uses for policy arguments may not be as distressing as I suggest, noting that my study looked at
opinions of trial courts—typically less concerned with setting policy for an entire jurisdiction—and that rule-based and explanation case uses may have triggered the result, with policy thrown on as icing on the cake.210 In this situation,
a court could decide the case without the policy rationales, and it might be rare
to find a judge who would say the law as applied leads to one result, but that it
changes because of a policy statement from a non-binding court. But because
policy arguments are often rooted in assertions about the state of the world and
human affairs, it is particularly concerning when a court relies on earlier court
decisions about such “legislative facts,” because the previous courts were often
in no better position to judge the facts than the instant court.211
Things grow a little less distressing as we move down the line. Given the
much smaller number of Supreme Court and circuit-court opinions than trialcourt opinions, judges might be justified in using examples from other circuit
courts (twenty-three instances) on grounds that the parties should easily have
been able to find the applicable precedents. But they should at least do so with
some caution and consider the relatively low cost of seeking parties’ argumentation on such instances. An even lower level of concern applies to examples
from binding courts (twenty-six instances), as the universe of potential cases
grows even smaller there. Finally, judges using rule statements from trial courts
(seventy-seven instances) should consider whether they can use a binding case
for the rule instead.
Though I have argued that judges should generally avoid endogeneity, the
remaining endogenous case uses are rules cited to binding courts or nonbinding circuits (210 instances). My suspicion is that these are the situations
where “many cases are simply interchangeable,” as Bennardo and Chew put it,
where the court and the parties could have cited any of a number of cases to
identify the same rule.212 The deeper qualitative examination I am performing
of these data now will confirm whether this is true. Regardless of that outcome,
as with examples above, judges should consider what purpose the endogenous
case serves and whether using the cases the parties cited would serve the law
just as well.
It may seem that the frequency of problem here is low. The sum of the five
most concerning categories—endogenous policy and example arguments—in
209

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590–92 (1994) (discussing
the policy tension between the first and fourth fair-use factors and presumptions that some
courts had adopted concerning them based on the Court’s earlier decisions in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
210 Email from Anne E. Mullins, to Brian N. Larson (Mar. 4, 2021, 3:15 PM) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Mullins].
211 See Gardner, supra note 19, at 1638–45.
212 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 108.
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Table 8 in the Appendix is only 163,213 barely 11% of the 1,437 case uses in
these opinions. We can take that argument in two ways. First, to some who
have serious questions about the risk of argumentative failure, 11% of all case
uses might seem like a quite-large number, especially when the risk can be
minimized with little cost. If the proportion seems small, however, that also
supports the argument that the cost to remedy the problem would be small, too.
What is the remedy, and what will it cost?
B. Rehabilitating Endogenous Cases with Parties’ Arguments
The remedy to the problem of endogenous citations is to avoid them to the
extent possible. We can achieve this with a few simple steps. I limit this recommendation to dispositive motions. For this purpose, I mean ‘dispositive’ to
include a slightly larger class than motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. I would expand it to include judgment on any motion that could in major
part resolve the case, including, for example, a motion by one party to exclude
a key witness for the other, without which the non-moving party would be unable to continue their claim.
When the court receives a dispositive motion and associated briefs, it
should immediately begin the research necessary to determine whether the parties failed to cite a case applicable to the problem. I recommend that the judge
do this before permitting any oral argument on the motion. If the court finds
endogenous cases it wishes to use, it should consider where they fall on the hierarchy of badness among endogenous case uses. Those involving endogenous
examples (or legal analogies) and policy arguments are the most concerning. If
the court truly does not need those cases, it can omit them from further consideration and proceed as it always would have.214
If some endogenous cases remain and appear important to the court, the
court should then invite the parties’ counsel to schedule oral argument, noting
that it wishes to ask them about the potential applicability of the endogenous
cases to the instant case. This approach has the virtue of making oral arguments
on such motions more valuable for the court and the parties than it might otherwise be. Rather than recapitulating the arguments in their briefs or engaging
in unproductive antics, the parties’ counsel are focused before the arguments on
what the judge wants to know. This approach also works to remedy a more
general objection to oral argument, that “lawyers begin oral argument in the
dark about the judges’ views of the case.”215
213

The sum of the values in Table 6 is actually 168, but five case uses appear in more than
one category there, as when, for example, a judge cites a non-binding circuit case both for a
policy and as an example.
214 I’m grateful to Professor Anne Mullins for pointing out that if the judge omits citing
such a case but nevertheless allows the case to influence their thinking, the parties “don’t get
the benefit of a window into the judge’s thinking, and that window can impact future parties’
choices in a way that could decrease efficiency.” Mullins, supra note 210. To such a judge, I
would say ‘Don’t do that!’
215 Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 33, at 992.
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Some judges may prefer to invite the parties to submit supplemental briefing, probably of limited length, on the endogenous cases, instead of holding
oral argument. This can also be a solution, but there are at least two reasons
that judges might avoid this practice: First, a brief is less interactive. If judges
genuinely want to explore the likely impact of endogenous cases on an instant
case, they can probably do so better in the quasi-conversational environment of
trial-court oral argument, a format that is more flexible than the appellate oral
argument. Second, briefs are probably more expensive for the parties.216 The
work to prepare for an oral argument is, for the most part, a subset of that required for a brief: the same research and analysis, but none of the need for multiple internal revisions and perfect citations. Conscientious counsel will probably rehearse for the hearing, but with a much narrower scope for its subject
matter; that preparation might be more modest than the typical, unfocused oral
argument.
There are at least two alternative approaches to this proposal that scholars
have considered. One has had some traction in appellate courts in the southwest
part of the country: sharing draft opinions with the parties. California Appellate
Justice Thomas E. Hollenhorst chronicled the development of the Tentative
Opinion Program in California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, in
the early 1990s.217 Hollenhorst described the system, where appellate panels
worked together with staff to prepare tentative opinions distributed to counsel
ten days before oral argument.218 He commented on the theoretical and practical benefits of that program, including oral arguments that were focused on the
issues most of concern to the appellate panels.219 The program later received
praise from the California Supreme Court.220 Others have suggested that similar practices in other states are useful and that the practice generally should improve the quality of judicial opinions.221 Another proposal is Abramowicz and
Colby’s call for “notice-and-comment” judicial opinions: “Once the court has
drafted an opinion, the court will withhold issuing the opinion in final form. It

216

I must acknowledge that I have not empirically confirmed the assertions that follow in
this paragraph, and at least one commenter argues my efficiency arguments are incorrect.
Judges know their own experiences best (often as former litigators themselves), and they can
decide accordingly.
217 Thomas E. Hollenhorst, Tentative Opinions: An Analysis of Their Benefit in the Appellate Court of California, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995).
218 Id. at 15–16.
219 Id. at 13–14.
220 See People v. Pena, 83 P.3d 506, 516 (Cal. 2004).
221 See, e.g., Mark Hummels, Note, Distributing Draft Decisions Before Oral Argument on
Appeal: Should the Court Tip Its Tentative Hand? The Case for Dissemination, 46 ARIZ L.
REV. 317, 340–41 (2004) (arguing that providing a draft of the court’s tentative ruling narrows the focus of parties and improves the quality of oral argument and judicial decisions);
Richard C. Braman, Prehearing Tentative Rulings Promote Intellectual Integrity in Judicial
Opinions and Respect for the System, FED. LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 50, 50 (“[T]he issuance
of a prehearing tentative ruling on substantive motions allowed counsel to focus at the hearing on those questions and issues important to the court, which almost invariably led to opinions that confronted the arguments raised by the parties with intellectual integrity . . . .”).
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will instead make the opinion available in tentative form to the parties and the
general public for comment (most effectively by posting it on the Internet).”222
These approaches are inadvisable, especially in the trial-court context. If
the trial judge is to circulate a tentative opinion, they must reach a tentative
conclusion, at least on some of the subsidiary points that they must judge. Once
they do that, however, the cognitive-science research suggests that it will be
very hard for them to change that view: the confirmation and coherence biases
will draw their thinking down the same path they have already gone.223 The
danger may be less for appellate panels, which circulate tentative opinions
making it clear that they have not yet agreed on the outcome indicated there.
For this reason, my proposal calls on the court to do its research before oral arguments but not to draft any opinions. This poses a challenge: I have noted
elsewhere, “[w]riting is epistemic. Legal analysts often do not fully understand
the question until they’ve written the first draft of the answer . . . . It is only
then that many sticking points . . . in the reasoning become obvious.”224 Nevertheless, to avoid the dangers of cognitive heuristics, the court should avoid deciding, to the extent possible, the impact of endogenous cases until hearing the
parties on the matter. Abramowicz and Colby’s proposal also requires a more
dramatic departure from current procedure, and they acknowledge that it would
come at significant cost.225 In fairness, though, it would address other concerns
not raised in this Article.226
I have also identified some challenges to my proposal that the comments of
some reviewers have echoed. First, there is concern that I propose to tie the
court’s hands, to prevent it from finding the law that applies correctly to the instant case. Second, there is a concern that the additional argument this Article
proposes will impose costs on some litigants who can ill-afford it. Finally,
judges’ concerns about efficiency are critically important.

222

Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 3333, at 1002.
See Bartels, supra note 3838, at 46; see also supra note 66 (discussing “bolstering”).
This is a limitation that Abramowicz and Colby openly admitted while discussing their proposal. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 3333, at 974; see also id. at 998 (acknowledging
that the bias becomes firmer once the reasoner’s commitment to a view has been made public); id. at 1017 (criticizing the draft-opinion approach on the same grounds).
224 BRIAN N. LARSON, LEGAL ARGUMENTATION (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 31) (on
file with author) (citing Robert Scott, On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic, 18 CENT. STS.
SPEECH J. 9 (1967)).
225 Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 3333, at 1018–19 (discussing whether benefits exceed
the costs of their proposal).
226 My proposal does not address Abramowicz and Colby’s other criticisms of the current
system, and particularly the concern that non-parties have an interest in decisions governing
the parties because of their precedential effects. Id. at 1006–07. Their concerns are further
legitimated in the trial-court context by the arguments of Gardner. Gardner, supra note 1919,
at 1654–58 (describing ways courts citing trial-court opinions may miscalculate the weight
of that authority); id. at 1658 (expressing concern about “analogical heuristics”—
“decisionmaking short cuts that simplify analogical reasoning into more binary and definitive answers”); id. at 1666 (exploring “misaligned tests”—those “in which the factors do not
quite fit the question being analyzed or one in which the analytical emphasis is misplaced”).
223
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First, my proposal does not tie judges’ hands. I encourage chambers to locate applicable law that the parties have not briefed. But I encourage them not
to assume that the parties have failed to find those authorities. They may, instead, have found them and set them aside as being insufficiently useful. I also
encourage chambers to be intentional in their searching. If they seek authorities
outside the briefs, what is motivating their searches? How will they ensure that
they are not applying cases in arguments that one of the parties might easily defeat on an appeal? Finally, the court can rehabilitate any endogenous citation
simply by allowing the parties a chance to argue it, as I have proposed above.
Second, my proposal benefits litigants who have precious few resources.
Imagine, for example, a legal-aid organization representing a client. Every minute of the time the client’s attorneys spend preparing for a case is a precious—
and limited—resource. Of course, those attorneys will work their best to brief
all the issues carefully up-front, but let’s assume the other party’s attorneys
have as well. Let’s assume further that the court has identified endogenous cases it wishes to use. If things are left as they are today, the judge may use those
endogenous cases in a way detrimental to our legal-aid client. At that point, our
client, who by definition has slim legal resources, must move to reconsider or
appeal. Each of these efforts to correct the judge’s decision initiates an entire
new round of briefing and argument—and incurs a significant cost; neither is
likely to succeed. If, on the other hand, the court adopts my policy, our legalaid attorneys have the choice whether to invest resources in researching what
will hopefully be a set of very few cases and to argue about their application
before the court. This represents a considerably smaller investment of resources.
In the case of pro se litigants, many courts have local rules regarding their
treatment, rules aimed at diminishing the likely power differential between the
party acting pro se and the other parties’ lawyers.227 But assuming that pro se
litigants are not attorneys, they face a much greater challenge than attorneys in
finding applicable authorities—they may not have the resources to find cases,
and they may not know how to assess them even if they find them. Surely, such
a party is better off knowing in advance which cases the court believes may be
applicable; that would be like throwing a life preserver to the litigant drowning
in a sea of authorities.
Finally, judges, particularly, may be concerned that this approach will
make for a less efficient docket. For example, one commentator has raised the
possibility that parties faced with page-count limits on briefs might “cite the
clear cases that support their side and not cite the trickier, more ambiguous cases.”228 If both sides take that stance regarding trickier cases, the parties may
await the judge’s order to brief those cases only after the judge finds them.
Such an odd dance could result in delays and inefficiencies. Tactical decisions
of this kind are possible, and they are similar to those where the moving party
227

See, e.g., E.D.N.Y & S.D.N.Y. JOINT LOCAL CIV. R. 7.2, 12.1.
Email from Colin Miller, Professor of L., Univ. of S.C. Sch. of L., to Brian N. Larson
(Apr. 15, 2021, 9:53 AM) (on file with author).
228
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does not lay out and rebut or undercut counterarguments in its principal brief.
There, if the opposing party does not raise a counterargument, the moving party
benefits from it never having been mentioned. The judge could nevertheless
raise the counterargument during oral argument or (conceivably) ask for supplemental briefing on it.
It is for these reasons that I have proposed using a single oral argument, after the court has done its research, to discuss endogenous cases. For many
judges on many motions, their clerks will already have performed research and
the judge will have read the briefs before an oral argument. This approach does
not even reorder the workflow of such chambers. It requires only that the court
give the parties notice of the cases it wishes to discuss. This addresses concerns
that the parties might not be prepared at oral argument to discuss the cases the
court has found. If the judge requests supplemental briefing, that would likely
extend the briefing schedule and postpone the decision, but this proposal discourages briefing as the preferred solution. Consequently, I don’t believe my
proposal worsens that situation.229 As for tactically gaming briefs, parties
would be unwise to do so because I don’t propose to compel judges to give the
parties a chance to argue endogenous cases.
That raises one concern not so much about my proposal as its likely adoption. Some commenters have noted that it would be difficult to impose this
proposal on judges. Of course, given the arguments here, I hope that judges
will decide of their own accord to follow this procedure. I do not propose legislation or formal rulemaking to impose the requirements because the empirical
question remains whether judges, chambers, and the parties would consider it
workable.230
C. Addressing Open Questions with Future Research
I have noted remaining questions and limitations in this study throughout
its description. Some of the following activities would serve to address those
questions and limitations. Each requires further research.
First, a deep qualitative assessment of all these case files could identify potential variables that might influence endogeneity. I am engaged in that process, and the results are in preparation. For example, some commenters on this
paper have asked why judges should give bad briefers a pass. This is a normative and practical question. I am assessing the quality of the briefs in my qualitative study, and we must recognize that “[i]f the lawyers fail to carry out their
duty, development of the case will be impeded, and the adversary process may
be undermined” and the situation “may impair judicial neutrality.”231 On the
other hand, if a judge’s own research and argumentation do not face critical
229

One challenge that does remain, however, is what the court is to do with endogenous
cases it might find after oral argument. Busy trial courts will be unlikely to want multiple
rounds of argument and briefing on an issue.
230 Cf. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 3333, at 1023–27 (discussing mechanisms for enforcing their proposal).
231 LANDSMAN, supra note 2828, at 4.
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evaluation, the decision may be wrong (or at least poor), and that does no favor
to future litigants or the judge. Qualitative study may also reveal nuances to the
different types of endogenous cases discussed above, including whether endogenous Rule citations to binding cases or non-binding circuit-court cases are really just citing some of many interchangeable authorities for a particular rule.
I am also following the cases after these opinions, especially to see whether and how parties appeal them. The arguments of the parties on appeal are
their response to the trial-court judge’s argumentation as described in Part I and
help to determine whether the opinions themselves were good or bad arguments. In fact, parties appealed sixteen of these cases, and in all but three of
those, the appeals court affirmed the trial court or the appeal was dismissed or
withdrawn. The court of appeals reversed case 12.06 on grounds the trial court
got the fair-use analysis wrong.232 Appeals of cases 14.09 and 17.09 proceeded
on other grounds.233
Second, Bennardo and Chew considered several judicial characteristics of
their 291 solo-authored opinions to assess their relation to endogeneity: party
of the president who appointed the judge, judges’ law schools, whether they sat
by designation, their age and years of experience as judges.234 On some of
these categories, they observed variation from their overall mean, but it is difficult to tell from their study whether these differences were statistically significant, given the sometimes very small subsets of their data and overlapping confidence intervals.235 I made no effort to assess these characteristics in this
study, but perhaps there would be value in adding these metadata to the opinions studied here in an effort to understand endogeneity practices in relation to
other variables we can evaluate externally.
Third, many questions about when and why judges use endogenous cases
can probably be answered only in chambers. Qualitative study that places the
researcher in the operational context of the court would prove valuable for understanding this system better. Questions we might explore include whether
endogeneity corresponds with so-called ‘active’ judges and not with ‘passive’
judges. If so, there might be correlates with active judging, perhaps greater attention to details, etc., that might support use of endogenous citations more despite the assessment I have provided above.
Fourth, an extension of the methods used in this study could determine
whether the findings here generalize to copyright fair use or to other substantive areas of law, to civil cases and criminal, to federal cases and state, and to
trial cases and appellate. Application of these methods is, however, time intensive. I am collaborating now with colleagues on using natural-language pro232

Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2014).
See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 849 F.3d 14, 16–17 (2d Cir. 2017); Code
Revision Comm’n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d
1229, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018).
234 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 2, at 93–105.
235 Id. at 94–98 (discussing endogeneity based on the appointing president of the presiding
judge on the appellate opinions).
233
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cessing tools to carry out my methods of analyzing briefs and opinions across a
broad spectrum of case files.
CONCLUSION
I have shown that endogenous case uses in courts’ opinions raise concerns
about the courts’ cognitive process and the products of their decisions—the
opinions themselves. Some kinds of endogenous case use are more dangerous
than others. I have shown, too, that in at least one randomly chosen sample of
opinions in one doctrinal area of the law, judges do not hesitate to use endogenous citations, and they appear not to recognize the greater danger of using
them for legal analogies and policy arguments.
The solution I have proposed is straightforward and practical: judges
should permit the parties to brief or orally argue the use of endogenous cases—
those judges identify in chambers through their own research—that may be applicable to the problem at bar. This solution is especially appropriate where the
court considers using an endogenous case for an argument by legal analogy or
argument from policy. Permitting adversarial argument in these instances rehabilitates these potentially dangerous endogenous cases, ensuring the court has
heard the parties and has the best resources for making a rational and defensible decision. For most judges, implementing these recommendations means
adding a paragraph or two to their individual rules of court and slightly reordering the briefing and oral-argument schedule for dispositive motions.
There will undoubtedly continue to be endogenous case uses in court opinions, but this proposal defuses the most dangerous of them.
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TABLE 1: LIST OF OPINIONS IN THIS STUDY, SORTED BY STUDY’S CASE-FILE NUMBER (N=55
OPINIONS)
Case
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
13.06
13.07
13.08
13.09
13.10
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.04
14.05
14.06
14.07
14.08
14.09
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.05
15.06
15.07
15.08
15.09
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
16.05
17.01

Citation
Bouchat v. NFL Properties LLC, 910 F. Supp. 2d 798 (D. Md. 2012)
National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F.
Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
Swatch Group Management Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 861 F. Supp. 2d 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)
Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012)
Cambridge University Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D. Cal.
2012)
Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings , Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2013)
Threshold Media Corp. v. Relativity Media, LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (C.D. Cal.
2013)
Morris v. Young, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
Rivera v. Méndez & Compañia, 988 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.P.R. 2013)
Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. Sony Pictures Classics Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701
(N.D. Miss. 2013)
Rosebud Entertainment, LLC v. Professional Laminating LLC, 958 F. Supp. 2d 600
(D. Md. 2013)
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (W.D. Wis. 2013)
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex, N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
Arrow Productions, Ltd. V. The Weinstein Company LLC, 44 F. Supp. 3d 359
(S.D.N.Y. 2014)
White v. West Publishing Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014)
TVEyes, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
Denison v. Larkin, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
Calibrated Success, Inc. v. Charters, 72 F. Supp. 3d 763 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
Hill v. Public Advocate of the United States, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Colo. 2014)
Richards v. Merriam Webster, Inc., 55 F.Supp.3d 205 (D. Mass. 2014)
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
North Jersey Media Group Inc. v. Pirro, 74 F. Supp. 3d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
Adjmi v. DLT Entertainment Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
Equals Three, LLC v. Jukin Media, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Galvin v. Illinois Republican Party, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Kennedy v. Gish, Sherwood & Friends, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 898 (E.D. Mo. 2015)
Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 151 F. Supp. 3d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
Ranieri v. Adirondack Dev. Group, LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)
BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Gossip Cop Media, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2016)
Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Vidangel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2016)
Olivares v. University of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 757 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 425 (S.D.N.Y.
2016)
Penguin Random House LLC v. Colting, 270 F. Supp. 3d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
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17.02
17.03
17.04
17.05
17.06
17.07
17.08
17.09
18.01
18.02
18.03
18.04
18.05
18.06
18.07
18.08
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Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Barcroft Media, Ltd. v. Coed Media Group, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 339, 45 Media L.
Rep. 2617 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Design Basics, LLC v. Petros Homes, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 712 (N.D. Ohio 2017)
Estate of Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 253 F.Supp.3d 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Peteski Productions, Inc. v. Rothman, 264 F. Supp. 3d 731 (E.D. Tex. 2017)
Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350
(N.D. Ga. 2017)
Oyewole v. Ora, 291 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Peterman v. Republican National Committee (2018), 320 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (D.
Mont. 2018)
Otto v. Hearst Communications, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Bell v. Moawad Group, LLC, 326 F. Supp. 3d 918 (D. Az. 2018)
Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. v. Valuewalk, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 3d 482
(S.D.N.Y. 2018)
FameFlynet, Inc. v. Jasmine Enterprises, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 3d 906 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
Stern v. Lavender, 319 F. Supp. 3d 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Ferdman v. CBS Interactive Inc., 342 F. Supp. 3d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

TABLE 2: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF ENDOGENOUS CASE USES IN OPINIONS STUDIED HERE,
IN ORDER OF DECREASING GROSS ENDOGENEITY (N=55 OPINIONS)
Opinion case uses

Endogeneity based on caseuse type

Total
12

Endogenous
12

Gross
Endogeneity
100%

Rule
100%

Example
100%

Policy
100%

W.D. Va.

31

26

84%

93%

71%

93%

16.01

N.D.N.Y.

24

19

79%

82%

100%

75%

17.04

S.D.N.Y.

31

24

77%

78%

67%

100%

13.02

C.D. Cal.

33

19

58%

56%

71%

54%

12.05

M.D. Fla.

15

8

53%

67%

33%

50%

16.02

S.D.N.Y.

34

17

50%

42%

86%

33%

17.07

E.D. Tex.

70

34

49%

46%

39%

50%

13.07

D. Md.

15

7

47%

55%

0%

0%

15.07

S.D.N.Y.

13

6

46%

25%

40%

100%

12.04

S.D.N.Y.

24

11

46%

45%

50%

33%

18.07

S.D.N.Y.

20

9

45%

67%

25%

0%

15.08

S.D.N.Y.

23

10

43%

43%

100%

75%

16.05

S.D.N.Y.

5

2

40%

25%

0%

0%

18.05

S.D.N.Y.

31

12

39%

31%

50%

43%

14.08

D. Mass.

13

5

38%

42%

0%

0%

18.04

D. Az.

21

8

38%

44%

33%

0%

15.06

E.D. Mo.

21

8

38%

31%

40%

25%

Case
14.06

Court
E.D. Mich.

14.03
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13.10

N.D. Cal.

8

3

38%

40%

25%

0%

16.04

S.D.N.Y.

21

7

33%

37%

0%

13%

14.01

M.D.N.C.

3

1

33%

33%

0%

0%

14.09

S.D.N.Y.

15

5

33%

38%

0%

50%

17.08

S.D.N.Y.

32

10

31%

26%

10%

0%

15.02

S.D.N.Y.

34

10

29%

23%

27%

29%

15.05

N.D. Ill.

40

11

28%

27%

50%

0%

15.01

S.D.N.Y.

47

12

26%

20%

50%

0%

12.03

C.D. Cal.

52

13

25%

20%

36%

0%

13.09

W.D. Wis.

40

10

25%

28%

27%

50%

18.01

S.D.N.Y.

16

4

25%

33%

50%

0%

15.09

C.D. Cal.

33

8

24%

32%

40%

0%

18.08

S.D.N.Y.

38

9

24%

37%

13%

50%

13.04

D.P.R.

17

4

24%

24%

50%

17%

13.03

C.D. Cal.

35

8

23%

24%

50%

0%

17.03

S.D.N.Y.

37

8

22%

21%

23%

13%

14.07

D. Colo.

5

1

20%

0%

100%

0%

17.01

S.D.N.Y.

21

4

19%

21%

0%

11%

17.09

N.D. Ga.

16

3

19%

18%

14%

0%

12.07

C.D. Cal.

17

3

18%

17%

33%

0%

14.05

N.D. Ill.

18

3

17%

0%

33%

67%

12.06

N.D. Ga.

52

8

15%

15%

0%

38%

17.05

N.D. Ohio

17

2

12%

7%

0%

25%

18.02

D. Mont.

19

2

11%

11%

0%

0%

13.06

N.D. Miss.

10

1

10%

11%

0%

0%

17.02

S.D.N.Y.

55

5

9%

13%

0%

10%

15.03

C.D. Cal.

27

2

7%

7%

8%

0%

13.01

S.D.N.Y.

42

3

7%

7%

7%

8%

16.03

S.D.N.Y.

30

2

7%

7%

0%

13%

17.06

C.D. Cal.

15

1

7%

8%

0%

0%

12.01

D. Md.

30

2

7%

10%

0%

0%

18.03

S.D.N.Y.

61

4

7%

8%

0%

9%

18.06

N.D. Ill.

26

0

0%

0%

0%

0%

13.08

W.D. Wash.

17

0

0%

0%

0%

0%

12.02

S.D.N.Y.

8

0

0%

0%

0%

0%

14.02

S.D.N.Y.

21

0

0%

0%

0%

0%

14.04

S.D.N.Y.

32

0

0%

0%

0%

0%

22 NEV. L.J. 739

798

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2

TABLE 3: BRIEF-DEPTH AND PARTY-RESOURCE SCORES FOR OPINIONS STUDIED HERE, IN
ORDER OF DECREASING GROSS ENDOGENEITY OF OPINION (N=55 OPINIONS)

Case

Court

Gross
Endogeneity

Brief depth in case uses

14.0
6
14.0
3
16.0
1
17.0
4
13.0
2
12.0
5
16.0
2
17.0
7
13.0
7
15.0
7
12.0
4
18.0
7
15.0
8
16.0
5
18.0
5
14.0
8
18.0
4
15.0
6
13.1
0
16.0
4
14.0
1
14.0
9
17.0

E.D. Mich.

100%

0

0.0

Comparative
-12.0

W.D. Va.

84%

4

4.0

N.D.N.Y.

79%

6

S.D.N.Y.

77%

C.D. Cal.

Max.

Avg.

Partyresource
score
Max. Avg.
0.0

0.0

-27.0

1.0

0.5

4.5

-19.5

4.0

3.0

13

9.5

-21.5

2.0

2.0

58%

38

36.5

3.5

1.0

1.0

M.D. Fla.

53%

34

21.5

6.5

1.5

1.5

S.D.N.Y.

50%

33

21.5

-12.5

2.0

2.0

E.D. Tex.

49%

54

44.5

-25.5

2.5

2.3

D. Md.

47%

29

18.0

3.0

1.0

1.0

S.D.N.Y.

46%

89

51.8

38.8

4.0

4.0

S.D.N.Y.

46%

17

9.0

-15.0

4.0

3.0

S.D.N.Y.

45%

10

6.0

-14.0

3.0

2.0

S.D.N.Y.

43%

9

8.5

-14.5

3.0

2.0

S.D.N.Y.

40%

9

4.5

-0.5

2.0

1.5

S.D.N.Y.

39%

11

10.5

-20.5

2.0

1.5

D. Mass.

38%

27

21.5

8.5

2.0

1.3

E.D. Mo.

38%

31

20.0

-1.0

4.0

2.5

D. Az.

38%

14

9.7

-11.3

2.0

2.0

N.D. Cal.

38%

14

8.5

0.5

4.0

2.8

S.D.N.Y.

33%

39

31.5

16.5

4.0

2.5

S.D.N.Y.

33%

40

30.0

9.0

3.0

2.0

M.D.N.C.

33%

18

14.0

11.0

2.0

1.5

S.D.N.Y.

31%

48

37.5

5.5

4.0

3.3
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8
15.0
2
15.0
5
15.0
1
12.0
3
13.0
9
18.0
1
15.0
9
18.0
8
13.0
4
13.0
3
17.0
3
14.0
7
17.0
1
17.0
9
12.0
7
14.0
5
12.0
6
17.0
5
18.0
2
13.0
6
17.0
2
15.0
3
13.0
1
16.0
3
17.0
6
12.0

S.D.N.Y.

29%

60

49.5

15.5

3.5

3.3

N.D. Ill.

28%

18

18.0

-22.0

1.0

1.0

S.D.N.Y.

26%

56

48.0

1.0

4.0

2.5

C.D. Cal.

25%

35

26.0

-26.0

4.0

2.5

W.D. Wis.

25%

47

31.7

-8.3

4.0

3.5

S.D.N.Y.

25%

23

14.0

-2.0

4.0

2.5

C.D. Cal.

24%

41

33.3

0.3

4.0

3.5

S.D.N.Y.

24%

75

42.5

4.5

4.0

2.5

D.P.R.

24%

17

14.0

-3.0

1.0

1.0

C.D. Cal.

23%

24

18.5

-16.5

4.0

2.5

S.D.N.Y.

22%

55

36.0

-1.0

4.0

2.5

D. Colo.

20%

19

12.5

7.5

2.7

2.3

S.D.N.Y.

19%

29

16.5

-4.5

4.0

2.5

N.D. Ga.

19%

21

14.0

-2.0

4.0

3.0

C.D. Cal.

18%

22

19.0

2.0

4.0

3.5

N.D. Ill.

17%

22

14.7

-3.3

2.0

1.3

N.D. Ga.

15%

57

33.0

-19.0

3.3

3.1

N.D. Ohio

12%

7

6.5

-10.5

2.0

2.0

D. Mont.

11%

40

26.5

7.5

2.5

1.8

N.D. Miss.

10%

27

25.0

15.0

4.0

2.5

S.D.N.Y.

9%

107

90.0

35.0

4.0

2.5

C.D. Cal.

7%

41

39.5

12.5

4.0

3.0

S.D.N.Y.

7%

79

71.0

29.0

4.0

4.0

D. Md.

7%

52

34.0

4.0

3.5

2.3

S.D.N.Y.

7%

30

18.3

-11.7

3.0

2.0

C.D. Cal.

7%

19

14.5

-0.5

3.0

2.5
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1
18.0
3
18.0
6
13.0
8
12.0
2
14.0
2
14.0
4

S.D.N.Y.

7%

150

96.0

35.0

2.0

1.5

S.D.N.Y.

0%

124

93.3

61.3

4.0

4.0

W.D. Wash.

0%

28

27.3

10.3

3.0

2.0

S.D.N.Y.

0%

50

36.8

28.8

3.5

2.3

N.D. Ill.

0%

29

19.5

-6.5

2.0

1.5

S.D.N.Y.

0%

63

52.3

31.3

2.0

1.8
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TABLE 4: CASE USES BY COURT CITED IN THEM AND ENDOGENEITY (N=1,437)
Total
case uses

Endogenous

Sticky

Supreme Court

397

57

340

Binding Circuit

621

163

458

Other Circuit

165

64

101

Same Trial

149

62

87

Other Trial

105

60

45

Totals

1437

406

1031

Cited court

By endogeneity

TABLE 5: RULE CASE USES BY COURT CITED IN THEM AND ENDOGENEITY (n=1,024)
Total
case uses

Endogenous

Sticky

Supreme Court

328

41

287

Binding Circuit

471

130

341

Other Circuit

87

39

48

Same Trial

89

46

43

Other Trial

49

31

18

1024

287

737

Cited court

Totals

By endogeneity

TABLE 6: EXAMPLE CASE USES BY COURT CITED IN THEM AND ENDOGENEITY (n=363)
Total
case uses

Endogenous

Sticky

Supreme Court

45

9

36

Binding Circuit

127

17

110

Other Circuit

81

23

58

Same Trial

54

17

37

Other Trial

56

28

28

Totals

363

94

269

Cited court

By endogeneity

TABLE 7: POLICY CASE USES BY COURT CITED IN THEM AND ENDOGENEITY (n=274)
Total
case uses

Endogenous

Sticky

Supreme Court

114

17

97

Binding Circuit

122

32

90

Other Circuit

14

10

4

Same Trial

15

8

7

Cited court

By endogeneity
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Other Trial
Totals

[Vol. 22:2

9

7

2

274

74

200

TABLE 8: ENDOGENOUS CASE USES IN ORDER OF DECREASING CONCERN,
SHOWING HOW FREQUENT SUCH USES WERE IN THIS STUDY (N=1,437)
Case-use type

Cited authority type

Total instances

policy

Non-binding

25

example

Trial court

45

policy

Binding

49

example

Non-binding circuit

23

example

Binding

26

rule

Trial court

77

rule

U.S. or circuit

210

